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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
FOREIGN-BORN CEOS, COUNTRY-SPECIFIC SKILLS, SELECTION,
AND STRATEGIC CONSEQUENCES
by
Yannick Thams
Florida International University, 2013
Miami, FL
Professor Aya Chacar, Major Professor
In this dissertation, I first suggest an extension of the managerial rents model and
more specifically the managerial skills typology that it offers. Building on research in
international business, I propose adding country-specific skills (CSS) to this typology in
addition to firm-specific, industry-specific, and generic skills. I define CSS as managers’
abilities that are applicable and specific to a particular national institutional context. Such
skills are distinct from the other three types identified and are likely to influence
managers’ performance and the performance of their firms.
So if CSS are distinct skills, what are the implications for strategy and
international business research? In an attempt to respond to this question, I conduct two
empirical essays in which I examine the implications of this refinement of the typology of
managerial skills for CEO selection and firms’ mergers and acquisitions (M&A) strategy.
In the first empirical essay, I puzzle at the fact that although CSS constitute a
barrier to high-level executive mobility across countries, there have been a growing
number of foreign-born CEOs being appointed across the globe. Why are these
individuals being selected for the post of CEO? Using information on the appointment of
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foreign-born and national CEOs from 2005 to 2010 among global 500 companies, I show
that internationalization pressures help explain their selection and that two types of firms
are likely to appoint foreign leaders: highly internationalized firms and firms that are
likely to internationalize.
In the second empirical essay, I examine the strategic implications of countryspecific skills. Employing the same sample as the one used in the first empirical essay, I
demonstrate that given that their mindset is likely to be less focused on firms’ home
market, foreign-born CEOs may be prone to institute more changes in firms’ cross-border
M&A strategy than their domestic counterparts. I also theorize on the moderating
influence of CEOs’ insiderness.
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Extending The Managerial Rents Model: The Role of Country-Specific Skills

ABSTRACT
This study extends the managerial skills typology of the managerial rents model. I
specifically propose adding country-specific skills in addition to firm-specific, industryspecific, and generic skills. Country-specific skills refer to managers’ abilities and
knowledge that are applicable and specific to a particular national institutional context.
These skills are valuable, rare, hard to imitate, and substitute. They are also distinct from
the other three types identified. I argue that ultimately their heterogeneity matter in many
arenas expanding on their impact for managerial selection, managerial actions, and
ultimately firm performance.
INTRODUCTION
Castanias and Helfat (1991) developed the managerial rents model that was
fleshed out and refined over the years (e.g., Bailey & Helfat, 2001; Castanias & Helfat,
2001; Holcomb, Holmes, & Conelly, 2009). Drawing on human capital theory, this
model reiterated the importance of managerial resources as important components of the
entire bundle of firm resources. It argued that managerial resources defined as skills and
abilities of managers are neither uniform nor homogeneous across firms and can generate
both Ricardian rent, due to rarity, and quasi-rent, due to co-specialization with the firm.
Another key contribution of this model is the managerial skills typology that it
provides. Contrary to previous typologies of managerial skills (e.g., Becker, 1962; Katz,
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1974; Steiner, Miner, & Gray, 1986) that ignored the external context in which managers
skills are employed, Castanias and Helfat (1991) took into account managers’
organizational and environmental settings. They developed a typology of managerial
skills composed of not only generic skills but also firm-specific skills and industryspecific skills. This study proposes two interrelated extensions to this model by drawing
on insights from international business (IB) research and institutional theory (Crossland
& Hambrick, 2007; 2011; North, 1990; 1991; Witt & Redding, 2009).
The first extension relates to expanding the typology of managerial skills to factor
in the broader institutional context in which managerial skills are employed. Indeed,
Castanias and Helfat (1991) argued that skills need to be considered in the environment
in which they are used and their importance reevaluated as the environment changes.
With industry globalization changing the environment in which firms operate and
geographic diversification altering firms’ competitive landscape (Wiersema & Bowen,
2008; 2011), another category of skills that is coming to the fore is the ability to manage
effectively within a national institutional environment or what I call country-specific
skills (CSS). Indeed, the national institutional environments in which firms are embedded
can alter their performance (Chacar & Vissa, 2005; Chacar, Newburry, & Vissa, 2010).
Moreover, national institutional environments shape managerial roles and skills
(Crossland & Hambrick, 2007).
I specifically argue that as managers develop firm-specific and industry-specific
skills being infused in a particular company or industry context (Castanias & Helfat,
1991), they are also likely to build skills and knowledge that are idiosyncratic to a
particular national institutional environment. I define country-specific skills as the
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abilities of managers that are developed through experience in a particular national
institutional context. Country-specific skills are valuable, rare, hard to imitate, and to
substitute (Barney, 1991). They are also distinct from the other three types identified and
will influence managers’ performance and the performance of their firms. Clearly, some
of the institutionally-related skills may fall under generic skills and are not categorized
under CSS. But just as managing in certain product markets or industries may require
specialized skills (Castanias & Helfat, 1991) compared to generic managerial skills,
managing in certain national environments requires idiosyncratic skills and knowledge
applicable to a particular national institutional environment. Managers also often
internalize the norms and management philosophy/ideology prevailing in their home
nations, which then become taken-for-granted (Porter, 1990). As such, managerial skills,
values, and ultimately actions may differ across institutional contexts.
The second extension relates to the formation of managerial skills. While the
managerial rents model focuses mainly on skills and abilities acquired primarily through
managerial experience or by exercising the managerial duty (Castanias & Helfat, 1991;
Harris & Helfat, 1997), I propose that managers are also likely to develop institutionallyrelated skills and CSS through personal experiences. Growing up and spending their
formative years in a particular country might help individuals develop cultural patterns
and other institutionally-related knowledge that could help managers exercise their
managerial duty (Nielsen & Nielsen, 2013). For example, being born and growing up in
Japan might help an individual develop cultural patterns centered on long-term
orientation. This long-term orientation might affect this person’s ability to engage in
quick decision-making (Crossland & Hambrick, 2007), a skill that may be indispensable

3

to manage in other institutional settings such as the United States where managers are
often evaluated on their firms’ quarterly results.
Considering the heterogeneity of CSS, it is important to study them and their
implications. I further explore the implications of country-specific skills for managerial
mobility and selection, firm performance, and managerial compensation. I first argue that
geographical diversification will bring to light the necessity to consider CSS in the
executive selection process. Second, I postulate that if CSS are rare, valuable, and hard to
imitate, they have the potential to generate a competitive advantage for firms considering
them as a managerial resource; such competitive advantage may in turn have a positive
impact of firm performance. In parallel, managers holding these superior skills may be
able to generate superior rent for the firm and for themselves in the form of higher
compensation.
In the following, I first review the managerial rents model and some of the work it
has inspired. I then make a case to add country-specific skills as an additional set of skills
that are crucial to consider with our increasingly global world. Finally, I draw some
implications and extensions for extant theory and discuss the implications of this study
and potential future research.
Exploring this research commands attention as it offers an important extension to
the managerial skills typology developed by Castanias & Helfat (1991). It also
complements current IB research on the role of institutional contexts in shaping economic
behaviors (North, 1991), by tying these contexts to the development of managerial skills.
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MANAGERIAL RENTS MODEL REVIEW
The importance of managers and human assets to firms has been the object of
interest of researchers from Taylor’s work on time and motion studies (e.g., Adler, 1993)
to the present (e.g., Holcomb et al., 2009; Ployhart, Van Iddekinge, & Mackenzie, 2011;
Wang & Barney, 2006). Microeconomic writing on the other hand often assumed away
the importance of managers by considering managerial skills as homogeneous and hence
irrelevant for study, and by describing the firm in terms of a production function
(Marshall, 1890). Speaking to these economists, Castanias and Helfat (1991) offered the
managerial rents model whose fundamental proposition is that ‘managers differ in the
type and quality of their skills’ (2001: 662).
While this proposition may seem obvious to most management theorists, it was a
an important contribution considering its background setting of neoclassical economic
thinking and models of firms assuming managerial homogeneity within and across firms.
Even within management theory, many scholars have examined whether top managers
and chief executive officers (CEOs) in specific, created value to the firm (Finkelstein,
Hambrick, & Canella, 2009; Lieberson & O’ Connor, 1972; Mackey, 2008; Thomas,
1988). Drawing on population ecology, other researchers also doubted the ability of top
managers to influence firm performance since top leaders may be highly constrained by
numerous inertial forces existing within large organizations and by their environment
(Finkelstein et al., 2009; Hannan & Freeman, 1977; 1984; Wasserman, Nohria, & Anand,
2001).
Within this background, Castanias and Helfat and colleagues proposed, in a
nutshell, that not only managerial skills are heterogeneous, but that they are also likely to
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be valuable, rare, and imperfectly imitable and substitutable and hence have the potential
to generate rent to the firm, alone or in combination with other firm resources (Bailey &
Helfat, 2001; Barney, 1991; Castanias & Helfat, 1991; 2001; Harris & Helfat, 1997). In
this model, managers can earn both Ricardian rent, due to rarity, and quasi-rent, due to
co-specialization with the firm. Most importantly, Castanias and Helfat and colleagues
argue that ultimately payment for skills, as well as the possibility of getting part of the
quasi-rent generated aligns managers’ interests to those of shareholders.
While this model has been extremely valuable and has a number of layers of
interest, I focus here on the typology of managerial skills that it offers. I review this
typology below and argue that it now needs to be broadened to take into consideration the
institutional environment of the firm.

Typology and Environment
The typology of managerial skills proposed by the authors was fleshed out as their
thinking progressed on the matter. In their original work, Castanias and Helfat (1991:
160) discussed three types of skills. First, generic skills refer to skills that are transferable
across industries, businesses, and firms. They could include general abilities such as
conceptual, leadership, and communication skills among many others (Katz, 1964;
Steiner et al., 1986; Yukl, 1981). General skills have also been described by economists
as skills acquired through formal education such as abilities developed when pursuing a
MBA (Finegold, Benson, & Mohrman, 2002; Murphy & Zábojník, 2004; Ployhart et al.,
2011). In addition, evidence from case-based research suggests that some executives’
general abilities such as “setting a vision, motivating employees, organizing, budgeting,
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and monitoring performance” can be easily transferrable across firms and environments
(Groysberg, McLean, & Norhia 2006, p. 1).
The second type of skills alludes to industry-related skills or the “technical,
regulatory, customer, or supplier knowledge unique to an industry” (Groysberg et al.,
2006, p. 3). The idea is that executives need to have enough industry background to
manage effectively (Castanias & Helfat, 1991). For example, a CEO leading a firm
operating under the rules of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration develop different
industry-specific skills vis-à-vis his/her counterpart managing a firm having to comply
with the requirements of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (Groysberg et al.,
2006). Similarly, managing an electric power company involves regulatory and
technological knowledge that is vital to the production and delivery of electric energy.
However, such skills may not be valued by firms providing other types of services (Neil,
1995).
The third category of managerial skills includes firm-specific skills. Firm-specific
skills have an immense value for organizations. Castanias and Helfat (1991) maintain that
“the ability to effectively manage an organization may require in-depth understanding of
the company’s history, culture, internal strengths and weaknesses, etc…” (159). Firmspecific skills could also be defined as “knowledge of how a firm operates, knowledge
about a firm’s key suppliers and customers, and knowledge about how to work
effectively with other employees” (Wang & Barney, 2006, p. 466). If we take the
example of a surgeon, his/her work depends to a great extent on his/her ability to work
effectively with other hospital’s employees. It is therefore imperative for surgeons to
develop knowledge about how to successfully communicate with nurses, anesthetists, and
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other surgeons of the particular hospital in which they work (Groysberg, Sant, &
Abrahams, 2008).
Bailey and Helfat (2001) then revised and streamlined this typology to include
four categories of skills that are also used in a follow-up article written by Castanias and
Helfat (2001). The authors argued that there are four rather than three types of
hierarchical managerial skills starting with the most specialized or ‘firm-specific skills,’ a
category identical in both the earlier and later classification provided by the authors. The
second and third classifications are a refinement of the prior ‘business or industry related
skills’ now separated into industry-specific skills and related-industry skills. The fourth
and final category is generic skills previously defined as “those that are transferable
across industries, businesses, and firms” (Castanias & Helfat, 1991, p. 160).
These skills could be conceptualized as a nested hierarchy of managerial human
capital with different echelons of skills (Castanias & Helfat, 2001). The hierarchy is
formed based on the degree of specificity of the skill to the company in which the
individual works (Harris & Helfat, 1997). Skills also vary according to their degree of
transferability and portability (Becker, 1964; Castanias & Helfat, 1991; Groysberg et al.,
2008). When executives move from a firm to another one within the same industry, their
previous company’s skills devaluate while their industry-specific knowledge could still
be highly valuable (Harris & Helfat, 1997). These skills can even become more valuable
considering they could include knowledge of a competitor’s operation (Finkelstein et al.,
2009).
Excluding the latter, firm-specific skills are the least mobile skills since they are
only applicable to the firm’s context as opposed to generic skills that can generate value
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for any firms using them (Holcomb et al., 2009). Extant research shows that such degree
of transferability and portability has important implications for managerial compensation
(e.g., Carpenter, Sanders, & Gregersen, 2001; Combs & Skill, 2003; Finkelstein et al.,
2009; Graham, Li, & Qiu, 2012; Harris & Helfat, 1997; Murphy & Zábojník, 2004). For
instance, in a study contrasting the initial compensation of internal CEO successors and
external successors, Harris and Helfat (1997) found that external successors might obtain
a pay premium vis-à-vis their insider counterparts partly due to the increased risk of
failure associated with their lack of firm-specific skills in their new company and the low
degree of transferability of their existing firm-specific skills.
According to Castanias and Helfat (2001), human capital and skills are identical
concepts and relate to “innate and learned abilities, expertise, and knowledge” (662).
While the authors acknowledge that managers can develop skills through different
mechanisms and that skills could be influenced by managers’ innate abilities and
personality characteristics, the mechanisms on which they focus is prior work experience
and the learning process which managers go through by performing their managerial
duties. As skills are intangible and difficult to codify and articulate, learning by doing
remains the key (Castanias & Helfat, 1991). Although books and other sources of
knowledge can be useful, building managerial skills essentially entails exercising the
managerial duty (Harris & Helfat, 1997). Consequently, empirical applications and
extensions of the managerial rents model have essentially used managerial experience as
a proxy for managerial capital (e.g., Adner & Helfat, 2003; Bailey & Helfat, 2001; Harris
& Helfat, 1997; Helfat & Bailey, 2005; Sturman, Walsh, & Cheramie, 2007).
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Drawing on this line of work and on the resource-based view of the firm, many
scholars have sought to empirically address the link between managerial skills and
abilities and rent generation. For example, studying a sample of technology-based firms,
Kor and Mahoney (2005) found that firms whose executives had extensive firm-specific
experience were in a better position to reap the economic returns of their R&D
investments. Similarly, Ployhart and colleagues (2011) showed using the context of
restaurant chains the importance of generic and unit-specific human capital in enhancing
firms’ ability to generate superior performance. Holbrook, Cohen, Hounshell, and
Klepper (2000) demonstrated that the success or failure of new semiconductor companies
could be partly explained by the prior career experience of their founders. Sturman and
colleagues (2007) examined the extent to which certain types of firm-specific skills could
be transferable to other firms and generate value for competing firms. In a similar vein,
Holcomb and colleagues (2009) corroborated the claim that managers could be a
significant source of value creation. Using the context of professional football and
focusing on industry-specific skills, the authors showed that managerial abilities could
have a significant bearing on how firms synchronize their resources to achieve a
performance advantage.

The Managerial Rents Model: Sowing the Seed for its Own Extensions
Based on this review, I identify two sets of interrelated questions that arise, one
concerning the typology of managerial skills and the second regarding the nature of skills
in the managerial rents model.
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First of all, albeit focused primarily on firms’ industry, Castanias and Helfat
(2001) clearly highlighted the importance of the external environment on the value of
skills. In a nutshell, they argued that the environment can dictate which of the four types
of skills proposed are more valuable. They also posited that as the environment changes
there will be an upheaval with different skills becoming more important. In the 1990s and
2000s, most mainstream management journals were focused on the domestic
environment of firms. As the field and the environment firms operate in have evolved, we
have become more aware of the importance of the global and national institutional
environment of the firm (e.g., Chacar, Newburry, & Vissa, 2010; Peng, Sun, Pinkham, &
Chen, 2009), in addition to its industry or task environment.
The first question that this paper then asks is: how does the increasing importance
of the global environment alter managerial skills that are valuable? Put differently, once
the country environment is not assumed to be homogeneous, how does the managerial
rents model need to be altered to reflect the changing times? Building on the work of
anthropologists (e.g., Levinson & Malone, 1980), political scientists (e.g., Peters, 2005),
sociologists (e.g., Durkheim, 1893; Weber, 1978), and economists (e.g., North, 1991),
management scholars have recognized that institutions are more than background
conditions and shape firms’ behaviors, their competitive advantage, and their
performance (e.g., Chacar & Vissa, 2005; Witt & Reading, 2009). As such, knowledge or
skills on how to operate in these environments are extremely valuable (Hennart, 1988).
Secondly, with their focus on demonstrating the importance of considering
managerial skills as a superior resource, Castanias and Helfat were clearly less interested
in discussing the nature of skills and their source, ultimately key essential questions. So
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what is the source and nature of managerial skills? Are all managerial skills learned on
the job or are there some skills that are learned much before any formal job
apprenticeship begins? A number of studies from various fields have highlighted the role
of people’s childhood and formative years in molding their abilities, values, and norms
(Inglehart, 1985; 2000; Schwartz, 1999; Seelhofer, 2010). Therefore, it may important to
consider this facet of people’s experiences to understand their abilities.
To respond to these two sets of questions, I first draw on institutional theory and
argue that similar to the fact that skills could relate to an industry context as noted earlier,
they are also likely to be shaped by the broader environment in which managers are
embedded, and especially the national institutional environment in which managers are
reared. Second, I show that these skills are likely to emanate from different types of
experiences rather than just on the job training (Hunter, 1988; Nielsen & Nielsen, 2013).

EXTENSION OF THE MANAGERIAL SKILLS TYPOLOGY:
ADDING COUNTRY-SPECIFIC SKILLS
Albeit focusing primarily on firms’ industry, Castanias and Helfat (1991; 2001)
exposed the role of firms’ external environment in shaping managerial skills. Here I
expand on this discussion by highlighting the importance of national institutional
environments and by examining the concept of country-specific skills. To begin with, a
limited research body, conducted by economists has already introduced the concept of
country-specific skills. This research has essentially shed light on immigrants’ labor
markets exploring workers’ human capital and the gaps in pay between immigrants and
native workers (e.g., Chiswick, 1978; Duvander, 2001; Friedberg, 2000; Kanas & Van
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Tuberken, 2009; Kim & Park, 2013). I build on and extend their work into the managerial
arena.
As suggested earlier, just as managers hold skills specific to an industry or to a
firm, they are also likely to develop country-specific skills or skills applicable within the
realm of a country’s institutional environment. CSS could be defined as managers’
abilities that are developed in a particular national institutional context. The complex
milieu of interrelated informal and formal institutions in which managers are embedded
may guide the development of their abilities and knowledge base (Crossland & Hambrick,
2007; 2011; North, 1990; Witt & Redding, 2009). According to North (1990), a
combination of informal and formal institutions guide individuals in coping with
uncertainty, interpreting the environment, and taking suitable actions. The influence of
institutions may also manifest in the development of managers’ skills; managers
embedded in a broader social context may develop beliefs, values, and strategic
preferences (e.g., Andrews, 1971) emanating from the informal and formal dimensions of
a country’s institutional environment.
Starting with informal institutions referring to norms, conventions, and values
governing social interactions (North, 1990), I argue that informal rules guide managers’
skills by influencing their patterns of thoughts, beliefs, and strategic actions. Informal
institutions have commonly been equated to national culture, defined as a system of
collectively held beliefs and values (e.g., Dikova, Sahib, & van Witteloostuijn, 2009;
Hofstede, 1980; Hosfstede & Hosfstede, 2005; Nielsen & Nielsen, 2013; Van Essen,
Heugens, Otten, & Van Oosterhout, 2012; Witt & Redding, 2009). A vast body of
literature has stressed the importance of national values (referring to “a broad tendency to
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prefer certain states of affairs over others” [Hosftede, 1980, p.19]) in driving economic
behaviors and exercising the managerial duty (Hofstede, 2007; Porter, 1990; Ralston,
Holt, Terpstra, & Kai-Cheng, 1997; Witt & Redding, 2009). It has been argued that
executives bring national values and beliefs to their tasks (Baily & Spicer, 2007). For
example, national values shape “elite mentalities” and managers’ enduring and
profoundly ingrained modes of thoughts disposing them to resort to particular
organizational ideologies1 (Guillén, 1994; Witt & Redding, 2009).
Cross-cultural management theorists have also distinguished a plethora of cultural
national values. Differences of societal values have been described based on different
dimensions such as power distance, individualism versus collectivism, uncertainty
avoidance, long-term orientation, performance orientation, etc… (e.g., Hofstede, 1980;
House et al., 2004; Schwartz, 1994). For example, collectivism could affect managers’
ability to engage in consensus-based decisions and take into consideration multiple
stakeholders when making strategic decisions; on the other hand, managers of
individualist societies may tend to favor unilateral decision-making (e.g., Aguilera &
Jackson, 2003; Crossland & Hambrick, 2011; Hofstede, 2007; Guillén, 1994). This heavy
emphasis on decision-making based on consensus may explain the reason why in
collectivist societies such as Japan, one of the most important selection criteria to hire a
manager remains his/her ability to get along with others (Von Glinow, Drost, &
Teagarden, 2002).

1

Aguilera and Jackson (2003) define ideology “as an institutional variable that influences management
both by imposing constraints as taken-for-granted world views and by creating normative expectations that
become ‘focal points’ for firm decision making” (458).
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Second, CSS may relate to abilities shaped by a country’s formal institutions
(Nielsen & Nielsen, 2013; North, 1990). Formal rules are explicit and codified and are
composed of economic and social policies, constitutions, laws, and property rights (North,
1990). Formal institutions regulate and govern economic behaviors and may alter firms’
strategic decisions (Chacar et al., 2010; Kostova, 1997; North, 1990). They may also
affect “information processing and problem solving in executive decision making”
(Nielsen & Nielsen, 2013, p.775). For example, formal rules may influence how
economic actors view the role of the government in constraining economic actions. For
example, in Japan the general idea that the state should intervene in the economy and
provide direction and leadership for the economy is very salient in executives’ mind
(Witt & Redding, 2009); compared to US executives who tend to favor minimal
governmental economic intervention. Such conceptualizations may have important
implications on what managers do in terms of their attempt to change the rules of the
game by lobbying and exerting pressure on the government.
Formal rules may also shape firms’ mode of governance and managers’
conceptualization of firms’ raison d’ être. For example, in shareholder-oriented countries
such as the US or the UK, management contractual responsibility emphasizes the
maximization of shareholders’ wealth. In other words, managers tend to make decisions
based on the premise that “public companies are not in the business to reward creditors,
inspire devotion of their employees, win the favor of the communities in which they
operate, or have the best products. These are all means to an end – making shareholders
richer" (Seely, 1991, p. 35). This perspective departs from that of stakeholder-centered
countries in which the corporation is conceptualized as a “social institution whose
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purpose is to further the interests of the corporation itself, typically considering the
interests of multiple stakeholders, including shareholders, employees, creditors,
customers, and the society” in which it resides (Fiss & Zajac, 2004, p. 501). This stark
difference will likely lead to a different managerial skill development path.
Finally, CSS encompass linguistic abilities (Brannen, 2004; Duvander, 2001;
Grinblatt & Keloharju, 2001; Hambrick, Davison, Snell, & Snow, 1998). Previous
research has indicated the utmost importance of language proficiencies for the conduct of
international business (Brannen, 2004; Geringer, 1988; Von Glinow, Shapiro, & Brett,
2004). Language barriers remain significant impediments to economic exchanges among
people from different nations (Ghemawat, 2001; Schmidt & Sofka, 2009). For example,
Geringer (1988) shows the critical role played by mutual language capability on the
success of joint ventures. Analogously, Von Glinow and colleagues (2004) demonstrate
the extent to which linguistic-related challenges in multicultural teams increase the
likelihood of conflicts among team members. Knowing a country’s language not only
fosters people’s ability to communicate, but also enables a manager to grasp the cultural
nuances and symbols associated with languages.

EXTENSION OF THE MANAGERIAL SKILLS TYPOLOGY:
HOW ARE CSS FORMED?
Castanias and Helfat (1991; 2001) primarily focused on skills acquired through
managerial experience as highlighted above. Indeed, managerial experience will be an
important driver behind the development of CSS. However, I propose that other types of
experiences might be relevant to build skills and particularly CSS. I build on the work of
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Katz (1974) who posits that skills develop not only “through practice” such as
professional or career experience but also “through learning related to one’s personal
experience and background” (98).
Personal experiences could include different facets of an individual’s life since
his/her birth. Growing-up and spending one’s formative years and being educated in a
specific country or even in a sub-region within a country may foster the development of
learning heuristic and cognitive tools and shape people’s values and norms (Berger &
Luckman, 1966; Guillén, 1994; Hambrick et al., 1998; Nielsen & Nielsen, 2013).
A wealth of research in different academic fields has documented the importance
of people’s childhood and formative years in molding their values and norms (e.g.,
Inglehart, 1985; 2000; Schwartz, 1999; Seelhofer, 2010). As observed by Nielsen and
Nielsen (2013), “cultural patterns of thinking, feeling, and acting are acquired in early
childhood because at that time a person is most susceptible to learning and assimilation”
(374). Growing up in a society exposes people to laws, customs, values, scripts, and
organizational practices that are imparted through a number of social institutions (e.g.,
family, schools, the community, workplace, media, etc…) (Hunter, 1988; Markus &
Kitayama, 1994; Schwartz, 1999). This experience cannot be easily replicated through
expatriate assignments, especially considering that most of them average less than three
years, for practical reasons.
The consequences of embeddedness in a set of formal and informal rules since
one’s birth are large. For instance, in societies emphasizing the self (e.g., individualistic
societies), social institutions operate in a manner that promotes the diffusion of such
value to individuals since their birth (Schwartz, 1999). Markus and Kitayama (1994)
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illustrated this process discussing the emphasis placed by parents in North America and
Europe on praising children and helping them realize their uniqueness and individuality
from their peers. The authors also described this process by highlighting the role played
by schooling. Thus, American schools typically give children the opportunity to be
recognized for some achievements or to be a “very special person” reinforcing the idea
that one is unique and independent from others. This sense of uniqueness and
individuality fosters the ability of people to make decisions based on their own judgments
as opposed to relying on consensus-based decision making.
In contrast, Japanese schools may stimulate a sense of the self as interdependent
with others encouraging students to take group photos or not leave the playgroup until all
members of the group are ready to leave (Markus & Kitayama, 1994). This strong sense
of interdependence with others is also likely to lead students to behave similarly. For
example, Wiersema and Bird (1993) noted the case of Japanese high school students who
were highly judgmental with classmates who had lived outside Japan and exhibited as a
result slightly different behaviors from the rest of the group; the authors observed that
these students were likely to be ostracized, prompting them to revert to identical
behaviors as the rest of the group. Therefore, Japanese executives’ inclination to value
the collective and to take into account various stakeholders when making decisions is
deeply rooted in the values acquired during their formative years (Witt & Redding, 2009).
There is also evidence that the imprinting effect of people’s childhood and
formative years is enduring and likely to be significantly anchored in their mind and
unlikely to change through subsequent experiences (Inglehart, 1985; 2000; Nielsen &
Nielsen, 2013). Zhou (1997) observes that even when living in another country
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(subsequently), people are very likely to consider their country of origin as a point of
reference. This might explain why managers, socialized and exposed from an early age to
“the value orientation of their cultural heritage” (Geletkanycz, 1997, p. 618), are strongly
influenced by their national culture when making strategic decisions (Crossland &
Hambrick, 2007; 2011). Their mindset is likely to have a strong imprint of their national
culture (Geletkanycz, 1997; Schneider & De Meyer, 1991). Porter (1990) even suggests
that by internalizing the norms and cultural values prevailing in their home nation, having
been exposed to them for such a long time, managers may take them for granted.

IMPLICATIONS OF CSS
As observed above, skills may embody the institutionally embedded experiences
along an individual’s path to becoming a manager (Hambrick et al., 1998; Nielsen &
Nielsen, 2013). While such experiences will always be important, they will become most
salient for individuals who have spent a significant number of years in several national
institutional environments. I discuss below the implications of CSS for managerial
mobility and selection, firm strategy and performance, and managerial compensation. To
do so, I primarily draw on key theoretical insights provided by the managerial rents
model rooted in RBV. First, the model suggests that managerial skills have an important
bearing on the selection and mobility of managers and that such selection will be shaped
by firm strategic circumstances (Castanias & Helfat, 2001). Second, it indicates that the
heterogeneity of managerial resources exhibited by skills differentials among managers
may prompt them to revert to distinct strategies and strategic actions (leading to different
performance implications). Third, the model proposes that superior and heterogeneous
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managerial skills could be a source of competitive advantage and therefore generate
superior rent for managers and firms (Castanias & Helfat, 1991; 2001); superior
resources are valuable, rare (or scarce), imperfectly imitable, and imperfectly
substitutable (Barney, 1991).

CSS, managerial mobility, and selection
What is the degree of transferability of CSS across national borders? Since CSS
are developed through managers’ significant embeddedness in particular national
institutional environments, on the one hand it could be argued that their applicability to
other institutional environments or their degree of transferability across national borders
remains low. Indeed, current research emphasizes the low integration of the executive
labor market since firms have a tendency to hire individuals with their home-country
specific skills. The skills and abilities required to effectively manage a firm differ
significantly across borders (Crossland & Hambrick, 2007; 2011; Ghemawat, 2007;
Hofstede & Hofstede, 2005).
Examples of such differences abound in comparative management research. For
instance, extant research has noted that executives from different countries might need
different sets of skills to manage stakeholders (Crossland & Hambrick, 2007; 2011). In
the U.S., it is highly expected that CEOs be able to deal with institutional investors and
manage the media (Crossland & Hambrick, 2007) since firms’ behaviors are highly
scrutinized by these types of stakeholders. In Japan, such skills are not valued to the same
extent since firms receive significantly less media attention. Alternatively, Japanese
culture’s emphasis on consensus-based decision-making and Japanese stakeholder-
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centered mode of governance may demand that CEOs develop important skills related to
their ability to deal with multiple constituents when making strategic decisions (Aguilera
& Jackson, 2003; Crossland & Hambrick, 2007; 2011; Guillén, 1994; Schneper &
Guillén, 2004).
On the other hand, we have seen during the past few years a growing number of
foreign-born executives whose CSS may relate to other countries than firms’ country of
origin. For example, following the appointment of Indian-born Vikram Pandit, the New
York Times pinpointed that he joined the ranks of 14 other foreign-born CEOs in the
Fortune 100 firms (NYT, 2007). In a similar vein, Inkpen and Ramaswamy (2005)
observed that 10% of FTSE 100 companies were run by non-nationals in 2003. Not only
foreign-born executive appointments are increasing in numbers but also they are
spreading to countries once considered impervious to the appointments of any foreigners
at any level. A recent Financial Times headline touted “Nomura goes all gaikokujin” in
face of its numerous foreign appointees and another “Japan Inc. to continue appointing
foreign CEOs” (FT, 2011).
What explains this puzzle? I note that firms’ globalization efforts may have
changed the degree of transferability of CSS and created a need for companies to appoint
leaders with other sets of CSS (Forbes & Piercy, 1991). Indeed, the increasing
globalization of markets and industries has significantly transformed firms’ business and
competitive landscape and has induced considerable changes in firms’ corporate strategy
(Forbes & Piercy, 1991; Wiersema & Bowen, 2008). More and more firms are expanding
their scope beyond their domestic market engaging in international diversification
(Wiersema & Bowen, 2008; 2011). Extant research stresses the central importance of
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executives and human assets in driving the success of multinationals and the economic
necessity for such firms to internationalize their corporate suite (Carpenter, Sanders,
Gregersen, 2001; Hitt, Tihanyi, Miller, & Connelly, 2006; Kirca et al., 2011).
Such internationalization needs are likely to alter the skills set sought in top
executives. Globalization efforts may strongly encourage firms to seek managers and top
executives hailing from outside firms’ home country and possessing skills specific to
other countries that are of importance to the firm (i.e., are relevant to any parts of their
operations be it sales, manufacturing, or other or are relevant to firms’ future
globalization related efforts). As it is the case for any types of diversification, firms
engaging in geographical diversification can achieve superior returns when their
diversification efforts match the profile of their human capital (in addition to other
resources) (Farjoun, 1994, 1998). More formally:
Proposition 1. Firm geographical diversification will foster the transfer of CSS
across national borders.
Proposition 2. Firms pursuing geographical diversification are more likely to
consider CSS in the executive selection process.

CSS, firm strategy, and firm performance
If CSS are distinct from the other three types identified, they are likely to
influence managers’ performance and the performance of their multinational firms.
Below, I consider the implications of CSS for firm performance distinguishing firms’
level of performance and the variability of their performance.
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Level of firm performance
As suggested above, a key insight from the managerial rents model inspired by
RBV is that firms whose managers possess superior skills may achieve above-average
performance (Castanias & Helfat, 1991; 2001). Superior resources could be characterized
as (1) valuable, (2) rare (or scarce), (3) imperfectly imitable, and (4) imperfectly
substitutable (Barney, 1991).
I argue that CSS could be a source of competitive advantage and constitute a
superior resource. First, CSS related to other countries from firms’ country of origin
could be relatively rare. Everything else being equal, it may be very difficult for firms to
find and recruit executives with foreign CSS in the executive labor market (Nielsen &
Nielsen, 2010). In addition, extant research has highlighted the remarkable homogeneity
of the corporate suite as it relates to CSS given the lack of global integration of the
corporate suite (Crossland & Hambrick, 2007; Ghemawat, 2007). Most CEOs and top
executives are country nationals whose institutional skills are significantly anchored in
their home country. For example, in a study conducted using a sample of the largest S&P
500 firms, Carpenter (2002) indicates that no TMT teams had more than one foreign
national.
In addition to being rare, CSS could be valuable. First, foreign CSS could play an
important role in shaping the values and cognitive orientation of managers. Executives
with foreign CSS have acquired important knowledge of other institutional environments
and could be expected to have skills conferring them greater confidence to operate in
foreign environments (Sambharya, 1996). Second, CSS could be a source of knowledge
about a particular country or region in which firms operate or wish to expand their

23

activities (Caligiuri et al., 2004; Nielsen & Nielsen, 2010). We know that knowledge of
institutional environments in which multinationals are present is instrumental for their
success and can reduce their liability of foreignness (Zaheer, 1995).
Third, managers with different CSS could bring diversity to the corporate suite
and embody a wide range of knowledge and experiences related to various institutional
environments (Earley & Mosakowski, 2000; Nielsen & Nielsen, 2013). The literature on
team diversity suggests that heterogeneous groups are expected to find novel perspectives
to non-routines problems such as international diversification (Nielsen & Nielsen, 2013;
Sambharya, 1996). This diversity of CSS could also help firms’ executives consider a
broader range of information and solutions when making decisions (Hambrick et al.,
1998; Sambharya, 1996). Fourth, CSS could foster the formation of a global network
since foreign individuals are likely to hold social ties with actors and entities in a
particular country or region. These ties could represent an important medium to obtain
important market resources and information (Sheng, Zhou, & Li, 2011). Global
expansion often hinges on firms’ ability to engage in alliances with foreign partners
(Carpenter et al., 2001). Contacts and social ties of CEOs and key executives can often
facilitate this alliance formation (Carpenter et al., 2001).
Despite the benefits of appointing individuals with foreign CSS, such executive
selection strategy could be imperfectly imitable. First, causal ambiguity could hamper
multinationals’ efforts to consider foreign CSS in their recruitment strategy (Barney,
1991; Daily, Certo, & Dalton, 2000; Rumelt, 1974). As argued by Carpenter and
colleagues (2001), firms may consider that what is truly needed for them to succeed is to
appoint executives with firm-specific skills, industry-specific skills, and generic skills
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such as strategic change management and general leadership skills. Critics often state that
“global complexity can be adequately managed through middle management, expatriates,
locals, or international consultants” (Carpenter et al., 2001, p. 495). Also, evidence
indicates that most firms’ operations are much more globalized than their executive suite
is (NYT, 2007).
Second, factors related to unique historical conditions could reinforce the
imperfect inimitability of CSS (Barney, 1991). Indeed, certain companies may have
developed over the years an organizational culture promoting diversity facilitating the
social integration of executives with foreign CSS such as foreign nationals. Appointing
foreign executives less rooted in firms’ domestic environment could be a testimony of
firms’ global identity and progressive organizational culture. Such global identity could
take years to come to fruition. Coca-Cola exemplifies such global identity. Thus, the
company has a long track record of selecting CEOs with foreign roots; it has selected
four foreign-born CEOs during the past few years (NYT, 2007).
In sum, if executive CSS are rare, valuable, and imperfectly inimitable, they may
have the potential to general superior performance. Hence, I propose:
Proposition 3. Multinationals considering CSS in the executive selection process
will outperform their peers.

Variability of firm performance
As noted earlier, Castanias and Helfat (1991; 2001) build on the resource-based
view of the firm to emphasize the importance of managerial skills (Barney, 1991). First,
the authors state that “managerial resources, defined as the skills and abilities of
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managers, are key contributors to the entire bundle of firm resources that enable some
firms to generate rents” (Castanias & Helfat, 2001, p. 661). Second, they claim that the
heterogeneity in managerial resources taking the forms of skills differentials among
managers of various firms could lead managers to engage in (and implement) distinctive
strategic actions, which in turn produce different performance outcomes.
Relating such heterogeneity argument to CSS, I suggest that multinationals
employing executives with various sets of CSS could devise different internationalization
strategies leading to different performance outcomes. Indeed, CSS could guide firms’
internationalization path and geographic scope. Managers with CSS primarily related to
firms’ home environment could have a “home bias” or “home-region orientation” and
may therefore exhibit a tendency to expand firms primarily in their region of origin
(Banalevia & Dhanaraj, 2013, p. 90). Conversely, managers with CSS related to other
regions are likely to make important changes related to firms’ operations and presence in
these regions (Nielsen & Nielsen, 2010). Such strategic moves would be expected
considering that such managers possess the institutional and cultural knowledge of these
regions and likely the relational capital that allows building additional knowledge needed
for success (Caligiuri, Lazarova, & Zehetbauer, 2004).
I argue that such disparity in internationalization paths and geographical scope
could have distinct implications for firm performance. Although results are mixed, we
know from IB research that firms’ geographic scope impact their performance (e.g., Qian,
Li, Li, & Qian, 2008; Qian, Khoury, Peng, & Qian, 2010; Rugman & Verbeke, 2004;
Wiersema & Bowen, 2011). Since various geographical scopes could lead to different
performance outcomes, and CSS could lead managers to engage in different
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internationalization paths, I propose that CSS may influence the variability of firm
performance.
The above arguments led me to formulate the following proposition:
Proposition 4. Differences in CSS lead to differences in the variability of firm
performance.

CSS and managerial compensation
Since superior managerial skills are a source of competitive advantage for firms,
it follows that managers holding such skills are likely to receive a pay premium
(Castanias & Helfat, 1991; 2001; Combs & Skill, 2003; Harris & Helfat, 1997). While
prior studies have examined the superiority of managers’ human capital in light of their
firm-specific skills, industry-specific skills, and generic skills (Carpenter et al., 2001;
Castanias & Helfat, 2001; Harris & Helfat, 1997), they have not considered according to
my knowledge CSS in the assessment of executives’ human capital.
As noted in the preceding sections, CSS may be rare since most executives tend to
be country nationals who may bring for the most part CSS related to firms’ home country
to the executive suite (in addition to the other types of skills previously mentioned).
Conversely, executives with foreign CSS contribute to the diversity of the corporate suite
and bring heterogeneous CSS to the table, which may be highly valuable to firms
operating in multiple countries.
If foreign CSS are valuable and rare and bring heterogeneity to the corporate suite,
it ensues that executives embodying such skills may expect to collect rents from this key
component of their human capital (Castanias & Helfat, 2001). Considering the pressing
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needs for many firms to succeed abroad and the importance for such firms to
internationalize the corporate suite, foreign CSS could provide executives with
negotiation arguments to increase their compensation. Likewise, boards of multinational
companies may be willing to grant a higher compensation to individuals who may bring
such international diversity to their firms.
In addition, since foreign CSS are relatively rare in the executive labor market,
and relatively costly to acquire (Nielsen & Nielsen, 2010), providing adequate
compensation for executives holding these skills could be a way to retain them
(Carpenter et al., 2001).
Based on the above-mentioned arguments, I hence propose that multinationals are
likely to provide a higher level of total compensation to executives with foreign CSS.
Proposition 5. Foreign CSS generate a premium pay.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Inspired by international business research, I first proposed in this paper an
extension to the managerial rents model and the typology of skills that it offers (Castanias
& Helfat, 1991; 2001). Specifically, I stressed the importance of factoring in the role of
national institutional contexts into our examination of managerial skills; I maintained that
in addition to their firm-specific, generic, and industry-specific skills, managers are likely
to have country-specific skills due to their embeddedness in particular institutional
environments (Nielsen & Nielsen, 2013). While the role of cultural and institutional
context has been largely surveyed in extant research (Shapiro, Von Glinow, & Xiao,
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2007), its importance has not been acknowledged in research on managerial skills and
managerial resources.
For example, there is a wide recognition in the field of international business that
institutional differences shape economic behaviors and affect multinational companies’
activities (e.g., Asmussen & Goerzen, 2013; Dunning & Lundan, 2009; Peng et al., 2009;
Salomon & Wu, 2012; Von Glinow et al., 2002; Witt & Redding, 2009). This paper
complements this large body of work highlighting the fact that managerial skills are
embedded in a large institutional context and positing that such embeddedness may have
important implications for the appraisal of managerial resources.
The second extension discussed in this paper concerns the formation of skills. The
managerial rents model and human capital theory in general have mainly focused on
managers’ professional and post-secondary educational experience and its influence on
their skills and the value of their human capital; they do not study other types of life
experiences that may have a significant bearing on peoples’ abilities. This paper argued
that in order to examine managers’ skills, it may also be important to look at their
experience during their formative years. I postulated that growing up and being raised in
a particular country may significantly shape people’s knowledge and abilities (Luo, 2005;
Nielsen & Nielsen, 2013) and are therefore salient elements of their human capital. This
conceptualization departs from that of human capital theory that essentially focuses on
educational and professional experience of managers. For example, Nielsen and Nielsen
(2010) acknowledge the benefits of hiring individuals with foreign backgrounds for
multinational corporations; however, they do not consider abilities acquired during these
individuals’ formative years as an element of their human capital. Instead, the authors use
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educational and professional experiences as proxies to evaluate their human capital.
Stressing the importance of people’s formative years, this paper also contributes
to a large body of comparative research that has explored the extent to which growing up
in a particular society allows people to be embedded in a number social institutions (e.g.,
family, schools, the community, workplace, media, etc….) that are likely to shape their
values and norms; however, this body of work has not theorized on managers’ skills and
abilities (Hofstede & Hofstede, 2005). For example, Markus and Kitayama (1994)
documented the impact of various social institutions (e.g., the media, family, and schools)
on people’s values such as the extent to which they value individualism versus
collectivism. Another study conducted by Nielsen and Nielsen (2013) note that growing
up in a country molds peoples’ cultural patterns of thinking, feeling, and acting without
making explicit references to abilities and skills.
Having made such extensions, I then zeroed in on the impact of CSS on
managerial mobility and selection, firm strategy and performance, and managerial
compensation. First, I proposed that while CSS may limit the mobility of executives
across borders, companies’ globalization efforts may have changed this picture. Hence,
multinationals are more likely to consider the selection of executives with foreign CSS.
This proposition is consistent with existing executive succession research recognizing the
need for firms to match new executives’ skills and backgrounds with their current and
future strategic needs (Finkelstein et al., 2009; Kesner& Sebora, 1994; Wiersema, 1995).
Second, I argued that managers with distinctive CSS might pursue different
international strategies that may subsequently have different impact on firm performance.
This proposition complements previous studies examining the strategic implications of
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executive successions; a large body of research has documented the impact of skills on
executive strategic choices. The premise of this research is that different skills will lead
to different strategic actions, which in turn has important implications for firm
performance. For instance, it has been argued that managers with firm-specific skills are
likely to value the status quo and initiate less strategic change than managers with no
firm-specific skills (Chen & Hambrick, 2012; Kesner & Sebora, 1994). Wiersema (1992)
found that outside CEOs (with no firm-specific skills) were more likely to engage in postsuccession product diversification than insiders.
Third, I proposed that foreign CSS may be rare, valuable, hard to imitate, and
substitute; hence, they may lead to superior firm performance and superior managerial
compensation. While a wealth research has surveyed the link between superior
managerial skills and rent generation, this body of literature has only taken into account
generic skills, industry-specific skills, and firm-specific skills (e.g., Kor & Mahoney,
2005; Ployhart et al., 2011). For example, using the context of restaurant chains, Ployhart
and colleagues (2011) investigated generic human capital and unit-specific human capital
and their ability to generate superior performance. Similarly, many studies have
addressed the impact of superior human capital on managerial compensation. By bringing
CSS to the fore and their link to managerial compensation, this study adds another critical
factor that decision-makers may need to consider when making compensation decisions.
Alongside the above theoretical implications, discussing country-specific skills
may shed light on a growing trend affecting the executive labor market (FT, 2012). In the
past, executives’ hiring was placed within the context of a national labor market and was
made evaluating executives’ human capital based on their firm-specific skills, industry-
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specific, and generic skills (e.g., Chen & Hambrick, 2012; Bailey & Helfat, 2001; Zhang
& Rajagopalan, 2003; 2004). This study brought to light an additional and important
component of human capital that may need to be factored in future research appraising
firms’ human capital. Furthermore, while extant research explains the lack of global
integration of the executive labor market by the low degree of transferability of CSS
across borders (e.g., Conyon & Murphy, 2000; Crossland & Hambrick, 2007), this study
showed that the need of foreign CSS by globalized firms may have started to change this
picture.
Finally, this study complements current research on international HR that have
highlighted the implications of various global staffing strategies used by multinationals to
manage their foreign subsidiaries (e.g., Levy, Beechler, Taylor, & Boyacigiller, 2007;
Perlmutter, 1969; Schneper & Von Glinow, 2012). Thus, scholars have discussed the fact
that multinationals often classified executives and managers according to their skills and
mindset which are largely contingent upon where they come from; multinationals are
likely to distinguish home-country nationals, local nationals, foreign nationals, and thirdcountry nationals (Kobrin, 1988; McCall & Hollenbeck, 2002). However, this body of
work has been silent on the selection of non-nationals to fill top executives positions at
firms’ headquarters and the skills that they may bring to the table.
The arguments and propositions advanced here, however, constitute only a first
attempt toward the examination of country-specific skills and their importance for firm
strategy, managerial selection and compensation, and firm performance. Future research
may further the exploration of CSS and address some of the limitations of the current
paper. First, I have focused on the implications of CSS as it relates to top executives and
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CEOs. Future studies could extend this research to firm governance. As pinpointed by
Castanias and Helfat (2001), the examination of firms’ managerial resources should
encompass board members since directors are a key component of firms’ corporate elites
(Jensen & Zajac, 2004). Indeed, to fulfill their monitoring role (e.g., Fama & Jensen,
1983) and advisory and counseling roles (e.g., Shen, 2003), board members will most
likely need the skills set and ability to comprehend the strategies proposed by top
managers (Castanias & Helfat, 2001; Daily, Ellstrand, & Johnson, 1996). In the context
of geographical diversification, boards members with CSS related to the company’s
expansion strategies might be an important strategic asset.
Second, my discussion is solely based on the implications of CSS without taking
into account their interplay with other types of skills. It may be worthwhile for future
research to survey the extent to which CSS might be combined with other forms of
human capital specific to a firm and an industry. For example, during the past few years
the press has highlighted a few cases of early departures or dismissals of CEOs with
foreign CSS because of their lack of firm-specific skills. We could think of the case of
the ex-CEO (Craig Taylor) of Nippon Sheet Glass, a Japanese company, who resigned
after less than two years in the role because of his fundamental disagreements with the
board on the pace and scale of restructuring (FT, 2012). Craig Taylor was appointed at
Nippon Sheet Glass after a 36-year career at Dupont.
In a similar vein, it could be argued that CSS may need to be explored in
conjunction with other firm resources and strategic resources. As argued by Holcomb and
colleagues (2009) building on Castanias & Helfat’s work (2001), “managers and
resources jointly determine firm success” (478).

33

In short, this study highlights a critical component of managerial human capital
that is increasingly prized in the executive labor market as more and more firms are
extending their realm across national borders. I hope that this research inspires other
researchers to delve further into managers’ CSS and their strategic implications.
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Firms’ Current and Future Strategic Needs and Foreign-Born CEO Successions

ABSTRACT
For the past decades, scholars have paid significant attention to surveying the
organizational antecedents of various types of CEO successions. A key insight in this
research is that firms tend to appoint new CEOs whose skills and abilities are in line with
their current and future strategic needs. Drawing on this literature, I explore the
organizational antecedents of foreign-born CEO successions. I first note the role played
by firms’ existing strategic context in driving the selection of foreign-born CEOs. As
firms expand abroad, the necessity to internationalize the corporate suite and appoint
leaders with deep knowledge of foreign institutional environments and less strictly
focused on firms’ domestic environment becomes salient. Second, I theorize on the
importance of firms’ future strategic needs and propose that firms that are likely to
internationalize or increase their international expansion may value the skills and
abilities of foreign-born CEOs. Using a sample of 253 CEOs appointed from 2005 to
2010 at the helm of Global 500 companies, I find support for some of my hypotheses.

INTRODUCTION
CEO succession research has provided rich insights about why firms choose
CEOs external to their firms and/or to their industry (e.g., Kesner & Sebora, 1994; Zhang
& Rajagopalan, 2003), two phenomena that used to be rare in large companies only a
couple of decades ago but have since become more common (Finkelstein, Hambrick, &
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Canella, 2009). This research stream generally builds on the premise that firms try to
match new CEOs’ skills and abilities with their organizational contexts and future
strategic needs (e.g., Datta & Guthrie, 1994; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Vancil, 1987).
More specifically, it postulates that changing firm needs lead to changes in CEOs’ profile
and the skills associated with that profile, be it general, firm-specific, or industry-specific
skills (e.g., Castanias & Helfat, 1991; 2001).
I argue in this paper that such general principle would apply in the case of a
nascent phenomenon: the rise of foreign-born or non-national CEOs. By foreign-born,
non-native, or non-national CEOs, I mean individuals who were born and spent their
formative years2 in a country other than their firm’s country of origin (Hambrick,
Davidson, & Snell, 1998). We have seen a dramatic rise in the selection of such
individuals and more recently at the helm of global firms albeit their hire is still seen as
heretic in a number of countries. In a 2007 article, the New York Times reported that 15
Fortune 100 companies were led by non-national CEOs (NYT, 2007a). In my own data, I
find that 18% of all firms that entered the fortune’s Global 500 ranking from 2005 to
2010 were led by a non-national CEO.
In order to explain this rising phenomenon, I first argue that the managerial skills
model needs to be extended to include country-specific skills (CSS) as an additional
element of the managerial skill typology (Castanias & Helfat, 1991; 2001). Similar to
how firm-specific skills originate from embeddedness in a firm, country-specific skills
are shaped through embeddedness in a country. More specifically, CSS refer to managers’
knowledge and abilities that are applicable and specific to a particular national
2

Formative years refer to the experience of an individual from his/her birth to when he/she reaches 17.
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institutional context. CSS could include language (Duvander, 2001), values, and a
mindset shaped by a country’s institutional environment. CSS could also relate to
expertise in dealing and building relationships with suppliers, customers, regulators, and
other key stakeholders in a particular country.
Once this extension to the managerial skills model is made, I shift attention to the
international context of the firm as an important driver in the selection of CEOs. Indeed,
as firms consider internationalization as a way to grow, and as they become more
international, the need for a chief executive with a deep understanding of foreign
institutional environments becomes more pressing. Often times, this need is
counterbalanced by the tendency to hire country nationals who may be better able to
understand the firm’s home country, and typically its center of gravity. As
internationalization pressures increase and competition grows, non-nationals become
more attractive candidates to the CEO position. Nationals with international skills
provide valuable skills that are relatively rare, but not so unique considering that the
typical international experience of a CEO is about 2 years (Carpenter, Sanders, &
Gregersen, 2001). On the other hand, foreign-born individuals come to the job with
institutional knowledge related to countries and regions other than firms’ home country
and region; their focus and orientation are likely to be less entrenched in firms’ home
nation. Ultimately, each CEO follows strategies that are built on their own skills, leading
them in a different direction, creating the heterogeneity that could provide the firm with a
competitive advantage (Castanias & Helfat, 2001).
More specifically, I maintain that a high level of internationalization will increase
the attractiveness of a CEO with country-specific skills other than home-country based.
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As such, as firms increase their internationalization, there will be an increased likelihood
of hiring non-national CEOs (H1). An increase of non-national successions will also be
observed in firms that are likely to face internationalization pressures, regardless of their
current level of internationalization. Examples of such firms would be companies with a
high product diversification level that may be observing the limits to product scope
economies (H2), or high growth firms that may face similar diseconomies when pursuing
national growth only (H3).
I test the above hypotheses examining new CEOs appointed at the helm of firms
part of the Global 500 ranking between 2005 and 2010. My final sample includes 253
new CEO appointments in 222 unique public firms located in 27 countries. After
controlling for country, firm, and industry effects, and executives’ international,
educational, and professional experience, I find support for some of my hypotheses.
The results of the study show the power of extant theory on the importance of
matching managerial skills to strategic and organizational needs and the necessity of
adjusting CEO skills when firm strategy requires change (Datta & Guthrie, 1994; Gupta,
1984; Kesner & Sebora, 1994; Vancil, 1987). The findings also bring full-on the
importance of understanding institutional environments of countries outside of a firm’s
home country at every level of the organization (e.g., Nielsen & Nielsen, 2010; 2013).
Furthermore, the findings highlight the possibility that hiring a manager embedded in a
different institutional environment brings a set of managerial skills that may constitute a
resource diversity to the firm. From a practical standpoint, this study shows that the
selection of foreign-born CEOs is not a fad or a bandwagon; instead, it may be a
phenomenon driven by real strategic needs and the limited potential for most nationals to
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be deeply embedded in other national institutional environments. This would explain the
appointments of notorious CEOs like Indra Nooyi who brought a unique strategy to
PepsiCo and pushed for increased market penetration in developing countries.
I proceed in the rest of the paper as follows. I first review the literature on CEO
succession relevant to the phenomenon of interest by emphasizing the organizational
antecedents to CEO selections. Second, I elaborate on the theory proposed in this
research. Third, I describe the study data, methods, and measures. Finally, I discuss my
results and conclude.

ORGANIZATIONAL ANTECEDENTS TO CEO SUCCESSION
To examine the antecedents of non-national successions, I build on previous
research linking organizational factors to various types of successions, which I review
below.
Succession research lies in the premise that “CEO succession outcomes should
reflect the antecedent conditions found in organizations” (Datta & Guthrie, 1994, p. 569).
Therefore, many studies have addressed the link between organizational factors and the
characteristics of newly selected CEOs (or different types of succession) (e.g., Datta &
Guthrie, 1994; Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2003) emphasizing the need for selection
committees to match new CEOs’ skills and characteristics with firms’ strategic needs
(e.g., Finkelstein et al., 2009; Giambatista et al., 2005; Kesner & Sebora, 1994). The idea
of “fit” has been salient in this research suggesting that “executive transition was more
effective if the characteristics of the successor matched the characteristics of the firm and
its environment” (Kesner & Sebora, 1994, p. 361).
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During the CEO succession process, boards often evaluate potential market
opportunities and threats and the corresponding skills that might be needed to develop
such opportunities (Finkelstein, Hambrick, & Canella, 1996; Vancil, 1987). The board
seeks “to match the skills of each candidate to the forward-looking skill needs of the
corporation” (Vancil, 1987).
Many studies have documented the link between organizational characteristics
and new CEOs’ skills and background. Table 1 below provides a summary of some key
studies that emphasize the idea that firms tend to match the skills and profile of new
CEOs with their organizational and strategic needs.

Table 1: Matching CEO skills to Firm’s Current and Changing Needs
CEO Skill/Background
Production/marketing
background
Legal/financial
Financial background
Technical background
Technical and financial,
marketing, administrative
Operations background
External CEOs (with no
firm-specific skills)

Relay successors (with
firm-specific skills)
Managerial background
International experience
General management and
financial background

Firm Profile
Internal diversifying firms

Example of Studies
Song (1982)

Acquisitive diversifying firms
Diversifying firms
Innovative firms
Maturing technology-based
firms
Declining performance
Poorly performing firms

Song (1982)
Fligstein (1987)
Datta & Guthrie (1994)
Drazin & Kazanjian (1993)

Highly performing firms
Firms in pre-IPO stage
Multinational firms
Firms pursuing the following
strategic types: defenders,
prospectors, and analyzers
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Ocasio and Kim (1999)
Allen, Paniam, & Lotz (1979);
Boeker & Goodstein (1993);
Canella & Lubatkin (1993);
Dalton & Kesner (1985);
Finkelstein et al. (2009); Zhang
& Rajagopalan (2004)
Zhang & Rajagopalan (2004)
Li & Canella (2003)
Magnusson & Boggs (2006)
Snow & Hrebiniak (1980)

While several organizational predictors to CEO succession have been discussed in
extant research, prior firm performance has received a great deal of attention (e.g.,
Boeker, 1992; Boeker & Goodstein, 1993; Datta & Guthrie, 1994; Giambatista et al.,
2005; Kesner & Sebora, 1994). Poor performance has been highlighted to be an
important antecedent to intra/outside firm successions. Finkelstein and colleagues (2009)
note that “the most obvious potential predictor of whether or not a new CEO will come
from the outside is the performance of the organization in the period before the
succession” (187). Firms with poor performance are likely to hire an external CEO, with
no firm-specific skills, as the latter might be perceived “as more able than insiders to
initiate and implement strategic changes” (Canella & Lubatkin, 1993, p. 763). The
assumption is that such lack of firm-specific skills brings a fresh perspective or fresh
blood to the company (Bigley & Wiersema, 2002; Chung & Luo, 2013; Finkelstein et al.,
2009; Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2010).
Besides its relevance to intra-firm and outside-firm successions, organizational
performance has been linked to other types of successor characteristics. For example,
Ocasio and Kim (1999) found that a decline of performance was associated with the
appointment of CEOs with operations background. Zhang and Rajagopalan (2004)
concluded that poor performance is negatively associated with the appointment of a relay
successor, or one in which “incumbent CEO works with an heir apparent and passes the
baton of leadership to the heir” – since poor performance might lead the board to
question the capabilities of the existing TMT (including the heir) to remedy the situation
(483).
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Several other organizational characteristics have also been linked to new CEOs’
characteristics. Zhang and Rajagopalan (2003) found that strategic persistence enhances
the likelihood of an intra-firm succession since it demands firm-specific skills (making
internal hiring desirable). Song (1982) demonstrated the link between corporate
diversification strategy and new CEOs’ functional backgrounds. The author showed that
highly diversified firms pursuing organic growth were more likely to appoint CEOs with
production/marketing experience vis-à-vis highly diversified firms engaging in M&As
that were more likely to value executives with legal/financial experience. Datta and
Guthrie (1994) indicated that innovative firms tend to hire CEOs with primary experience
in technical functional areas since individuals with these backgrounds are more likely to
understand such firms’ core operations and technologies. In a similar vein, Drazin and
Kazanjian (1993) demonstrated that technology-based companies that are in their growth
phase were more likely to appoint CEOs with a technical background vis-à-vis firms in
their mature stage that tended to have CEOs with financial, marketing, and administrative
expertise.
This study draws on this body of work to take the realm of this research from the
national context to the international arena; I examine the strategic contexts leading firms
to hire foreign-born CEOs who may bring other sets of skills and abilities to the table. I
first expand on these skills and abilities and elaborate on my theoretical model in the
subsequent section.
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NON-NATIONAL VERSUS NATIONAL CEO SUCCESSIONS
Before discussing the strategic antecedents of non-national successions, I expand
below on the types of skills and abilities that non-national CEOs are likely to embody.
As noted previously, board members are likely to consider new CEOs’ skills and
their fit to firms’ strategic needs when making hiring decisions (Vancil, 1987).
Castanias and Helfat (1991; 2001) developed a typology of managerial skills that
is useful in organizing past work. In this typology, they build on human capital theory to
propose that managerial skills are comprised of firm-specific skills, industry-specificskills, or generic skills. It seems that when board members review candidates’ human
capital, they are likely to examine these managerial skills when making hiring decisions
(Castanias & Helfat, 1991; 2001).
CEO succession research has highlighted the importance of firm-specific skills
when considering internal versus external CEOs (e.g., Canella & Lubatkin, 1993; Shen &
Canella, 2002). In addition, the literature has paid attention to industry-specific skills
when considering CEOs’ industry origin (e.g., Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2003), and generic
skills such as CEOs’ functional and educational background (e.g., Datta & Guthrie, 1994).
Firm-specific skills are valuable and rare and can help firms gain a competitive advantage
(Castanias & Helfat, 1991) albeit when great change is necessary they may hamper
change efforts (Baily & Helfat, 2003). Industry-specific skills are also of a valuable
nature; hiring external CEOs from the same industry is likely to increase the chance of
learning from the strategies and practices of competitors in the same industry (Zhang &
Rajagopalan, 2003). Generic skills such as for examples executives’ ability to set a vision
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for a firm or their leadership skills are highly valued; their absence may put firms at a
competitive disadvantage (Barney, 1991).
What skills and abilities do foreign-born managers bring to the table? In order to
examine this question, I argue that in addition to firm-specific, industry-specific, and
generic skills, we need to consider an additional dimension of managerial skills – what I
call country-specific skills (CSS).
CSS relate to skills that originate from an individual’s embeddedness in a national
institutional context (Duvander, 2001) and refer to managers’ abilities and knowledge
that are applicable and specific to a particular national institutional context. CSS could
also include an individual’s language (Brannen, 2004; Duvander, 2001; Von Glinow,
Shapiro, & Brett, 2004) and an individual’s values and mindsets that are shaped by the
formal and informal institutional environment in which he/she is embedded (Crossland &
Hambrick, 2007; Hofstede & Hofstede, 2005; Nielsen & Nielsen, 2013). They are for the
most part acquired through growing-up, being educated, and spending one’s formative
years in a specific country (Nielsen & Nielsen, 2013). As argued by Nielsen and Nielsen
(2013), “cultural patterns of thinking, feeling, and acting are acquired in early childhood
because at that time a person is most susceptible to learning and assimilation” (374).
Such patterns are likely to be significantly anchored in somebody’s mind and are unlikely
to change through subsequent experiences (Hofstede & Hofstede, 2005; Nielsen &
Nielsen, 2013). For example, CEOs, socialized and exposed from an early age to “the
value orientation of their cultural heritage” (Geletkanycz, 1997, p. 618) might be strongly
influenced by their national culture when making strategic decisions (Crossland &
Hambrick, 2007; 2011).
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Nationals can become embedded in other institutional contexts, developing skills
and knowledge related to other institutional environments. But as a Siemens executive
told me in an interview, “spending two to four years in Brazil does not mean that you
understand well how Brazil operates.” While international professional experience
changes the knowledge and skill profile of a manager, it may not be as fundamental as
the skills and abilities shaped by imprinting (Caligiuri & DiSanto, 2001; Nielsen &
Nielsen, 2010). Even when living in another country (subsequently), people are likely to
consider their country of origin as a point of reference (Zhou, 1997). This might explain
why nationality has been recognized as a “superordinate determinant of identity” and a
determinant likely to be even more salient than characteristics such as race, gender, and
other “status-determining traits” (Dahlin, Weingart, & Hinds, 2005, p.1111).
Hence, two individuals born and raised in two different countries are likely to
have a different set of country-specific skills, as two managers socialized in two different
firms will acquire distinct sets of firm-specific skills. Such skills will not only be specific
to a particular country but also related to a region (in an n dimensional space) in which an
individual’s country is located. For examples, French nationals are often more familiar
with French speaking countries and areas and their institutions, such as the French
speaking part of Canada or Lebanon (Ronen & Shenkar, 1985). English men and women
are more familiar with countries that were part of the British colonial empire, such as the
English Speaking part of Canada and Australia (Ronen & Shenkar, 1985). In a similar
vein, individuals from developing countries, with often less developed and enforced laws,
tend to understand better how such institutional environments operate (Cuervo-Cazurra &
Genc, 2008).
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In addition to foreign CSS, I argue that foreign CEOs might embody the ability to
bring a unique global perspective to firms given their increased international background.
Being exposed to two or more cultural systems having been raised in a foreign country
and living in a different country from their country of origin, foreign CEOs may be able
to understand foreign cultures with ease (an important success factor for geographically
diversified firms) and to bridge among different national cultures. In addition, research
(stemming from psychology) on individuals significantly exposed to more than one set of
cultural schemas suggests that such individuals may possess a rich behavioral repertoire
and a strong ability to develop complex cultural representations (La Frambroise, 1993;
Brannen & Thomas, 2010; Nguyen & Benet-Martínez, 2007). Such complex cultural
representations might enable foreign CEOs to exhibit a high level of cross-cultural
literacy and intercultural sensitivity (Nguyen & Benet-Martínez, 2007).
The example of Carlos Ghosn is often cited when referring to a leader whose
cultural adaptability and unique global personal experience (being born and raised in
Brazil and being the CEO of Renauld-Nissan) have conferred him unique skills to
manage a very complex organization composed of two companies coming from very
distant institutional environments (Japan and France) (Birkinshaw, Brannen, & Tung,
2011). In an interview conducted by CNN in 2008, Carlos Ghosn noted that without his
multinational background, he would not have been so successful at managing both
companies.
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Strategic Antecedents to Non-National CEO Successions
What types of firms are likely to choose a non-national CEO succession? The
theoretical premise of this paper is that two facets of strategic contexts may prompt firms
to select a non-national CEO. The first dimension relates to firms’ existing strategic
needs. I argue that firms with greater levels of international involvement may face
important internationalization-related challenges and are likely to value the unique
country-specific skills and knowledge that a foreign-born leader brings (Brannen &
Thomas, 2010; Nielsen & Nielsen, 2013). The second facet concerns firms’ anticipated
strategic needs. Since board members usually make hiring decisions based on their
anticipations of firms’ future strategy, I propose that organizations that are likely to
internationalize or those that are likely to increase their internationalization may also
value the skills that non-nationals may possess. Examples of such companies include
firms susceptible to experience limitations or diseconomies in their current strategies
following product diversification and high levels of organizational growth.
Figure 1 summarizes the conceptual framework that I propose in this research and
on which I elaborate below.
Figure 1: Conceptual Model
Current
Strategic
Needs

Future
Strategic
Needs

Internationalization

Foreign‐Born
CEO Succession

Product Diversification

Organizational Growth
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Current Strategic Needs
I posit here that the choice between a foreign-born versus a national candidate is
influenced by the relative importance of firms’ international operations. Although greater
internationalization could represent a significant source of business and economic
opportunities (Contractor, Kundu, & Hsu, 2003; Hitt, Hoskisson, & Kim, 1997), it poses
important challenges for managers. First, dealing with different cultural and institutional
environments and various competitive landscapes (Kostova, 1997; Sanders & Carpenter,
2008) requires that managers overcome their domestic myopia and likely ethnocentric
mindset (or home-country orientation) (Levy, Beechler, Taylor, & Boyacigiller, 2007;
Perlmutter, 1969). Drawing on their strengths, managers tend to rely on the experience
and repertoires of routines developed in their domestic environment (Barkema &
Vermeulen, 1998) – which may or may not be adequate to manage across borders.
Nadkarni, Herrmann, and Perez (2011) point to the fact that managers are likely to use
their domestic mindsets as “reference points”, “cognitive filters”, and “knowledge
repertoires” when managing firms’ global operations (511). While managers may
eventually develop enough institutional knowledge about other institutional settings from
their home country, it takes time to form complex institutional and cultural understanding
that would enable them to manage in a way that transcend their home-nation’s culture
and institutional environment (Levy et al., 2007).
Third, despite the need for multinational corporations to hire leaders with
significant international experience, evidence suggests that such managerial skills and
abilities remain rare and costly. For example, Carpenter and colleagues (2001) note that
the “direct or indirect costs of acquiring and retaining an internationally-seasoned CEO
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may be prohibitive” (496). The authors highlight the limited number of top executives
with significant international professional experience that are available in the executive
labor market. Moreover, individuals with international experience tend to have relatively
more limited and homogenous experience resulting from a couple of short assignments
abroad (Magnusson & Boggs, 2006; Nielsen & Nielsen, 2010; Ondrack, 1985).
I propose that the limited number of internationally seasoned executives and the
difficulty inherent in transitioning their strategic focus from a national to a global one
may create the need for firms to consider the appointment of individuals who do not hail
from their home country. Firstly, such individuals add heterogeneity to firms’ managerial
resources known to create a potential to generate a competitive advantage (Castanias &
Helfat, 1991; 2001). Being born and raised in a foreign country and having lived in firms’
home country might confer foreigners a different set of cultural knowledge and insight,
value systems, and psychological make-up (Hambrick et al., 1998) that could be
beneficial for multinational companies. When these executive skills are combined with
firm-specific resources, they have a potential to distinguish a firm’s strategy from that of
its competitors and to increase the expected value of its strategy. Note here that there may
also be important risks associated with such strategy as exemplified with the fast
departure of many foreign CEOs such as Howard Springer, the ex-CEO of Sony.
Second, considering that their country-specific skills may not relate to firms’
home country, foreign-born CEOs may be able to understand the formal and informal
institutions of firms’ existing and potential operations in their countries/regions of origin
(Duvander, 2001; Nielsen & Nielsen, 2010; 2013). For example, when Vikram Pandit
was appointed at the head of Citigroup in 2007, the New York Times reported that one of
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the key factors (besides his analytical skills) that made him the best candidate for the
position was his knowledge of emerging markets coming from India (NYT, 2007b).
Despite firms’ pressing need to internationalize the C-suite, such changes may not
happen overnight since firms might be reluctant at first to hire an individual who is not at
the image of their national origin (Duvander, 2001). Howard Anderson (professor at the
Sloan school) commenting on the hiring of foreign-born CEOs in the US observed in a
New York Times interview that “some corporate boards might still not be comfortable
with foreign-born chief executives because they feel they have more in common with
another American” (NYT, 2007a). In addition to such homophilic tendencies (Zajac &
Westphal, 1996), boards might take time to adjust their top executives recruitment
strategy and to redefine the skills set sought in a new leader considering the difficulty
associated with breaking established routines (Hannan & Freeman, 1984). Therefore, I
propose that boards of companies with a higher level of internationalization will be more
prone to recognize the need to appoint a foreign-born CEO.
Finally, operating in a large number of countries, highly internationalized firms
are likely to be exposed to a more nationally-diverse executive labor market (Nielsen &
Nielsen, 2013) which might enhance the likelihood of hiring a foreign-born CEO.
Therefore, I formally propose the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1. There is a positive relationship between a firm’s level of
internationalization and the likelihood of a foreign-born CEO succession.
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Anticipated Strategic Needs
As discussed earlier, board members could make hiring decisions based on their
anticipation of firms’ future strategic needs (Giambatista et al., 2005). In addition to
firms that already have a strong international footprint, firms that may internationalize or
may increase their international presence might consider the appointment of a foreignborn CEO. I postulate that firms with a high level of product diversification and those
that are growing rapidly are likely to fit such profile.
Indeed, firms pursuing growth can often achieve their goal via national
expansions. Firms can also diversify their product portfolio. Product diversification refers
to expansion into new product areas and has been a popular corporate strategy especially
among large firms (Hitt, Hoskisson, & Ireland, 1994).
While such strategies can be fruitful, they can both ultimately encounter limits as
it relates to their potential. In the case of product diversification, many firms discover the
limits to diversification due to the unrelatedness of the product markets in which they
operate or the inability to generate economies of scope across divisions. Indeed, extant
research suggests that product diversification does not significantly enhance firm
performance (especially in the case of unrelated diversifiers) (Chatterjee & Wernerfelt,
1991; Hitt et al., 1994; Kim, Hwang, & Burgers, 1989; Palich Cardinal, & Miller, 2000).
Considering such challenges, geographic diversification may become a viable
strategic option available to firms seeking to enhance their performance. Indeed, research
has shown that product diversified firms (related and unrelated) can increase their
performance by diversifying internationally (Hitt, Hoskisson, & Ireland, 1994; Kim et al.,
1989). Hitt and colleagues (1994) postulate that international diversification could help
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product diversified firms exploit economies of scale and scope and achieve
interdependencies across product areas, and therefore enhance their performance.
Similarly, Parkhe (1991) maintains that the simultaneous consideration of product and
geographic diversification is critical for companies to realize an optimal allocation of
resources. This proposition has been supported empirically. For example, Kim and
colleagues (1989) found that geographical diversification moderates the relationship
between product diversification and performance. Their findings also indicated that
unrelated diversifiers with a high level of geographical diversification achieved higher
corporate profit growth than unrelated diversifiers with low geographical diversification.
Since internationalization could be an important source of business and growth
opportunities for product diversifiers, such firms are likely to seek the necessary
managerial resources to handle their international endeavors. This will increase the
likelihood of hiring a national CEO with significant international experience but also a
foreign-born CEO. The number of candidates to the chief executive position with
significant international experience is known to be limited (Carpenter et al., 2001). In a
world of trade-offs, non-nationals can bring foreign country-specific skills and the deep
knowledge it takes to operate in a region.
Hence, I formulate the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2. There is a positive relationship between a firm’s level of product
diversification and the likelihood of a foreign-born CEO succession.

In the case of organizational growth, a high level of organizational growth implies
that a firm might run out of domestic opportunities. Therefore, international growth might
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become a promising option and appointing a foreign-born CEO might be beneficial since
he/she might be a suitable candidate to implement firms’ international growth strategy.
This desire to grow their foreign operations might create a strong need for these
firms to internationalize the executive suite by appointing a foreign-born leader (NYT,
2007a). Given their foreign country-specific skills, foreigners might be thought to be
capable of carrying out firms’ international growth strategies. The hiring of foreign-born
CEOs may also increase the cultural diversity of the corporate suite that could be
beneficial to international expansion. Evidence suggests that foreign-born CEOs are
likely to hire other foreign-born executives (Nielsen & Nielsen, 2010). For example,
Sidney Taurel, the Moroccan-born ex-CEO of Eli Lilly (a US pharmaceutical giant), is
well known for his strong commitment to globalize the company’s C-suite by tapping
into talent from all over the world. Two years after his appointment to the post of CEO,
half of the senior executives working at Eli Lilly's headquarter were foreign.
In addition, foreign-born CEOs’ international experience and foreign national
origin might also serve as a strong signal of firms’ commitment to global expansion and
international growth. I therefore hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 3. There is a positive relationship between a firm’s level of
organizational growth and the likelihood of a foreign-born CEO succession.
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METHODS
I test in this study the drivers of the selection of a foreign-born or non-national
CEO. Given the dichotomous nature of the independent variable, I employed logistic
regression to test the hypotheses, lagging the explanatory variables by one year in line
with previous succession research (e.g., Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2003). I also checked the
robustness of my findings using mixed effect logistic regression methodology to control
for the nested structure of the data (as multiple successions might have occurred within
one company). The results are unchanged.
Below is an overview of the sample selection procedure, the data sources, and the
measures used in the study.
Data
The starting sample for this study was all firms listed in the Fortune Global 500
ranking from 2005 to 2010 resulting in a total of 689 unique firms from 36 countries. 156
firms were then removed as they were privately-held, state-owned, or subsidiaries of
other firms. 376 CEO succession events were then identified for the remaining 533 firms.
Information on CEO names and appointment dates came mostly from the Fortune Global
500 website. Missing names were collected from multiple sources including the
Directory of Corporate Affiliations, Corporate Library (for US firms), Hoovers, and
companies’ annual reports.
The primary sources of data used to obtain information on CEOs’ appointments
were the Directory of Corporate Affiliations, companies’s annual reports and 20F,
companies’s website, Lexis Nexis, Business Week Executive Profile, Hoovers, Who’s Who
in Business and Finance, and Bloomberg. From these data sources, I could also gather
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information on the national origin and career and educational experience of 293 CEOs.
Information about firm and industry level characteristics was found from Bloomberg,
Capital IQ (a Standard and Poor’s database), companies’s annual reports and 20F,
Worldscope (a Thomson Reuters’ database) and Compustat Segment. After merging the
firm and industry level data collected, I could obtain a final sample of 253 CEO
successions taking place in 222 unique firms (located in 27 countries). 194 of these firms
experienced one succession, 25 two successions, and the remaining 3 firms had three
succession events in the six-year period of the study.

Table 2: Successions Characteristics per Year
Year
Number of succession events
Percentage of non-national
successions

2005
34
24%

2006
50
22%

2007
56
16%

2008
48
25%

2009
37
32%

2010
28
25%

Measures
Criterion Variable
Foreign-Born CEO Succession. This is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if a CEO
was born and raised in a country other than his/her firm’s country of origin and 0
otherwise. CEO nationality was collected from various CEO biographical sources
including Hoovers, companies’s annual reports and 20F, Bloomberg, Lexis Nexis, and
Who’s Who in Business and Finance, and a 1000 CEOs. The location of a firm’s
headquarter was gathered from Compustat North America, Compustat Global,
Bloomberg, and Capital IQ. 3 firms had dual headquarters and were assigned to the
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oldest headquarter’s country for convenience. Out of the 253 successions observed, I
could identify 59 foreign-born CEO successions. The table below provides more details
about the breakdown of successions per year.
Explanatory Variables
Firm Level of Internationalization. This construct is measured by the degree of
internationalization (DOI), a commonly used measure of a firm’s foreign involvement.
DOI is the share of foreign operations within a firm (Tihanyi, Griffith, & Russell, 2005)
measured by its foreign sales ratio or a firm’s foreign sales divided by its total sales (e.g.,
Geringer, Beamish, & daCosta, 1989; Wiersema & Bowen, 2008). The data to compute
this ratio were obtained from firms’ annual reports and 20F, Capital IQ, and Bloomberg.
Product Diversification. Product diversification is measured by Jacquemin and Berry’s
(1979) entropy measure of diversification. This entropy is defined as ∑i [Pi x ln(l/Pi)],
where Pi refers to the proportion of a firm’s sales attributable to segment i and ln(1/Pi) is
the weight attributed to each segment (e.g., Hitt et al., 1997; Wiersema & Bowen, 2008).
It takes into account the number of product segments in which a firm operates and the
proportion that each segment represents in a firm’s total sales. Firms’ sales were
classified according to their four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC); number of
segments reported by firms varied from 1 to 10. Product segment sales were obtained
from Worldscope and Capital IQ.
Organizational Growth. This variable is measured by the percentage change in firms’
total sales from one year preceding the succession over the two years preceding the
succession event (Datta & Guthrie, 1994). Sales data were obtained from Bloomberg.
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Control Variables
Various firm, industry, time, CEO, and country controls were included to the
statistical models to rule out potential alternative explanations. I controlled for fixed firm
effects; in addition, the study controls for prior firm performance and firm size. Firm
fixed effects intend to correct for the potential lack of independence of observations since
as indicated above a firm could experience multiple successions within the period under
consideration in this paper. Although all firm-level and industry-level variables are
measured at t-1, prior firm performance is measured at t-2 as poor prior performance has
been shown to be a determinant of succession (e.g., Kesner & Sebora, 1994). To
operationalize firm performance, I used adjusted return on assets (ROA) defined as a
focal firm’s ROA adjusted by its industry ROA. Data for firms’ ROA and industry ROA
were collected through Bloomberg.
Firm size, an important determinant of CEO succession (Grusky, 1963; Kesner &
Sebora, 1994), was operationalized using the natural logarithm of total assets. Other
measures of sizes such as the natural logarithm of sales and employees were also
considered for robustness check as described below. All measures of size were obtained
from Bloomberg. I controlled for firms’ country of origin given that patterns of CEO
recruitments vary across countries (Crossland & Hambrick, 2007; 2011). The study also
controlled for year of hire operationalized by the year in which a CEO was appointed
(Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2003).
At the industry level, a control is made for the level of an industry’s
competitiveness by including a measure of industry concentration. This variable is
captured by the four-firm concentration ratio for a company’s main Global Industry

67

Classification Standard (GICS3) (Chacar, Vissa, & Newburry, 2009). Data to calculate
this ratio were collected through Bloomberg.
At the CEO level, I controlled for CEOs’ company of origin, a dummy variable
taking a value of 0 if a new CEO has had at least two years of tenure in the hiring firm
and 1 if the new CEO was externally appointed. There were 61 external successors and
192 internal CEOs. Past research has highlighted the importance of CEOs’ international
experience especially in the context of multinational companies (Carpenter et al., 2001;
Sambharya, 1996).
To quantify international experience, I followed previous research and created a
factor taking into account CEOs’ educational and professional experience outside their
home country and their firm’s country of origin. The factor is composed of the following
three indicators: 1) educational experience 2) number of years spent abroad 3) number of
countries in which an individual worked. I also controlled for other CEO characteristics
such as age and industry of origin. They are excluded from the results for simplicity since
the results of the study remained unchanged when they were included in the analysis.

RESULTS
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics and correlation matrix. Since the
correlation between international experience and product diversification was greater than
0.30 in absolute value, I examined the data to detect potential threats of multicollinearity.
I computed variance inflation factors (VIFs) and found a mean VIF of 1.18; no VIF was

3

GISC distinguishes 24 industry groups.
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superior to 2.13 suggesting that there is no collinearity threat among the independent
variables (Kleinbaum, Kupper, & Muller, 1988).
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Table 3: Summary Statistics and Zero-Order Correlation Coefficients
Variables
1. Foreign CEO Dummy
2. Firm Size
3. Adjusted ROA
4. External CEO Dummy
5. CEO’s Intl. Experience
6. Industry Concentration
7. Free Cash Flow
8. Year of Hire
9. DOI
10. Pdt. Diversification
11. Organizational Growth

Mean
0.24
10.28
-0.04
0.24
4.26
0.25
1706.7
3
2007.3
5
0.39
0.61
9.28

SD
0.43
0.85
3.86
0.43
7.00
0.10
15065.
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1.55

1
1
-0.01
0.02
0.21
0.24
0.03
0.04

2

3

4

5

6

7

1
0.02
-0.08
0.07
0.14
0.12

1
-0.04
0.16
0.00
0.04

1
0.25
-0.06
0.04

1
0.07
0.05

1
-0.00

1

0.05

0.14

0.04

0.04

0.03

-0.20

0.11

1

0.27
0.53
26.57

0.2
0.08
0.13

0.23
0.13
0.02

0.09
-0.08
0.15

0.02
-0.02
0.00

0.29
0.10
0.09

0.01
-0.32
-0.00

0.02
0.00
-0.03

0.07
-0.06
-0.11
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8

9

10

11

1
0.16
-0.02

1
0.04

1

Table 3 presents the results of the logistic regression. In Model 1, or base model,
only the control variables are included. In Model 2 (3 and 4 respectively), I tested the
relationship between DOI (product diversification and organizational growth,
respectively) and the likelihood of a foreign-born CEO succession. Model 5 presents the
results of the full model.

Table 4: Drivers of Foreign-Born CEO Appointment
Variables
Model 1
Model 2 Model 3
Control variables
Industry Concentration
1.282
1.888
2.600
Firm and Country fixed-effects
Inc.
Inc.
Inc.
Adjusted ROA
-0.007
-0.006
0.000
Firm Size
-0.026
-0.185
-0.123
Free Cash Flow
-0.000
-0.000
-0.000
External CEO dummy
0.810*
1.126**
0.869*
CEO’s Intl. Experience
0.064**
0.033
0.060**
Year of Hire
0.102
0.087
0.139
Predictor variables
DOI (H1)
3.046***
Product Diversification (H2)
0.621†
Organizational Growth (H3)
N
253
253
253
Likelihood ratio chi-square
26.25
29.72
46.90
Pseudo-r2
0.095
0.1082
0.170
Log likelihood
-124.283
-113.960
-122.547
†
*
**
***
Note: ( )p<0.1; ( )p<0.05; ( )p<0.01; ( )p<0.001

Model 4

Model 5

1.388
Inc.
-0.020
-0.033
-0.000
0.812*
0.065**
0.129

3.013†
Inc.
-0.016
-0.265
-0.000
1.167*
0.031
0.148

0.011*
253
29.78
0.108
-122.51

3.156***
0.446
0.013*
253
53.47
0.194
-110.675

In model 1, the coefficients for two control variables are statistically significant
namely CEOs’ company of origin and international experience. These results indicate
that foreign-born CEOs are more likely to be externally appointed and have more
international experience than national CEOs. International experience loses its statistical
significance in models 2 to 5; but the sign of its coefficient remains positive.
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Overall, the results obtained in model 2 to 5 lend support to this study’s overall
theoretical premise that firms’ existing and future strategic context will be significantly
related to the likelihood of a foreign-born CEO succession. In hypothesis 1, I argue that
there is a positive relationship between a firm’s level of internationalization and the
likelihood of a foreign-born CEO succession. As model 2 shows, DOI is statistically
significant (p<0.001) and the sign of the coefficient is positive supporting H1. The results
of model 3 provide support for H2 (p<0.10) positing that there is a positive relationship
between product diversification and the likelihood of a foreign-born CEO succession.
However, as shown in model 5, product diversification loses its significance when
entered in the full model so H2 is not supported. In Model 4, I tested the relationship
between organizational growth and the likelihood of a non-national CEO succession. The
results support this hypothesis (p<0.05). In model 5 (full model), the sign and
significance of DOI and organizational growth remain unchanged, indicating the stability
of the findings for H1 and H3.
Post hoc analysis and robustness checks
I performed an additional battery of tests to check the robustness and stability of
my findings. The first set of tests concerns the use of alternative operationalizations of
some control variables. I reran the models using adjusted ROE as an alternative measure
of firm performance. The results remained unchanged. Similarly, I tested the hypotheses
using different measures of firm size such as log of assets and log of employees and
found identical results.
In the second series of tests, I introduced other control variables. Following
succession research stressing the role played by previous CEOs in the succession process
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(e.g., Finkelstein et al., 2009; Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2003), I added to my models a
variable capturing whether or not the previous CEO (prior to the succession) was foreign.
Previous CEO national origin is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the previous
CEO was born and raised in a country other than his/her firm’s headquarter country and 0
otherwise. I identified firms’ previous CEOs using Bloomberg, Directory of Corporate
Affiliations, and companies’ annual reports and 20F. To find previous CEOs’ national
origin, I used the same sources as the ones employed to find the national origin of newly
appointed CEOs. The results were in line with the ones reported in the earlier section. I
also controlled for industry globalization measured by the average foreign sales ratio of
each firm’s primary industry (Carpenter et al., 2001). Data collected from Computat
Segments were used to compute this variable. The results were also consistent with prior
findings.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Scholars have examined the selection of CEOs from different backgrounds and
origins and their fit with firms’ strategic needs and profiles. Following on their footsteps,
I examined a new phenomenon: the appointment of foreign-born CEOs. The results
obtained in this study demonstrated that with increased levels of internationalization, the
likelihood of hiring a non-national to the chief executive position increases, highlighting
the importance of country-specific skills, a set of skills that has not yet received due
attention in the literature. These results complement a burgeoning area of study whereby
researchers have examined executives’ national origins and have explored national
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diversity and its consequences in the context of TMTs or boards of directors (e.g.,
Nielsen & Nielsen, 2010; 2013; Ramaswamy & Li, 2001).
These findings are also in line with prior work showing the influence of firms’
strategic context on CEO successions (Datta & Guthrie, 1994; Finkelstein et al., 2009;
Kesner & Sebora, 1994). Various types of successions (e.g., intra-firm/outside-firm
successions, intra-industry/outside-industry successions) and their determinants have
been studied in extant research (e.g., Finkelstein et al., 2009; Kesner & Sebora, 1994;
Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2003); but, very little is known about non-national CEO
successions and their organizational antecedents. The realm of CEO succession research
has been largely confined to the domestic setting and to the examination of CEOs’
company and industry origins. This study adds to this body of literature and highlights
the importance of considering CEOs’ national origin and its implications for CEO
selection.
In addition to exploring firms’ current strategic and organizational needs, I
focused my attention on firms’ future strategic developments – knowing that such factors
may drive executive hiring (Vancil, 1987). I hypothesized that firms experiencing a high
level of organizational growth are likely to run out domestic opportunities and may
therefore consider a leader with deep knowledge of foreign institutional environments
such as a non-national individual. The results corroborated this claim.
This study complements previous research exploring executives’ international
professional experience (Carpenter et al., 2001; Daily, Certo, & Dalton, 2000; Sambharya,
1996) by emphasizing the importance of national origin as a key element of executives’
profiles. Although some scholars alluded to the importance of executives’ national origin
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in their research, the appointment of foreign leaders was too rare to study in large scale
empirical research (Carpenter, 2002; Carpenter et al., 2001). Carpenter and colleagues
(2001) demonstrated that globalization-related challenges are a major impetus for this
change. Second, this study complements extant research on bi-culturalism conducted
primarily by psychologists and cross-cultural management theorists who have largely
concentrated their efforts on studying bi-cultural employees and have neglected top
executives (e.g., Brannen & Thomas, 2010). Third, on a methodological note, this study,
by taking into account CEOs’ formative years, proposes an improved measure of national
origin; prior research (e.g., Nielsen & Nielsen, 2013) has only taken into account
individuals’ place of birth ignoring therefore their formative years.
As a first attempt to assess the strategic antecedents to foreign-born CEO
selection, the paper has limitations offering important avenues for future research. First,
my sample is composed of the largest global firms introducing a potential size bias in the
analysis and limiting the external validity of this research. In addition, a majority of the
largest publicly traded global firms come from developed markets limiting also the
generalizability of the findings. Second, as noted by Nielsen & Nielsen (2013), “while
nationality is a powerful analytical construct, it is not completely deterministic as other
factors may influence an individual’s institutionally embedded experiences” (380). Given
the secondary nature of the data, I was not able to take into account rich details of
people’s life that may influence their institutionally embedded experiences. For example,
some individuals might have dual nationalities, parents of different nationalities,
etc…(Nielsen & Nielsen, 2013). Third, given the international nature of the sample and
my use of secondary data, I was not able to identify the national origin of 83 CEOs (out
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of 376 successions identified from 2005 to 2010), constituting a 22% sample size
reduction.
In addition to addressing these limitations, future research could explore
additional questions regarding the appointment of foreign-born CEOs. For example, a
vast area of research building on upper echelon theory (Hambrick & Mason, 1994) has
addressed the impact of executive experiences on organizational outcomes (see
Finkelstein et al., 2009 for a review). Future studies could therefore seek to explore the
following questions: what is the strategic impact of their appointment? Do they pursue
more risky internationalization strategy compared to country nationals? Second, it might
be fruitful to select a few cases of foreign-born CEOs and employ qualitative analysis to
understand the profound impact of their background on their management style and
philosophy. Qualitative analysis could also help examine the complex nature of CEOs’
life experiences. For example, if we take the case of Carlos Ghosn (CEO of RenauldNissan), although he was born and raised in Brazil, he is French and the “offspring of a
Lebanese father and a French mother, and he speaks six languages including Arabic and
now some Japanese” (Birkinshaw et al., 2011, p. 574). Considering such nuances could
deepen our understanding of the institutionally embedded knowledge and abilities that
CEOs bring to the table.
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Foreign-Born CEO Successions and Changes in M&A Strategy

ABSTRACT

While extant research suggests that CEOs’ company and industry origins may
shape their strategic actions, little is known about CEOs’ country of origin and its
strategic implications. In this paper, I build on this research and explore the link between
foreign CEO successions and changes related to firms’ M&A strategy. I argue that
foreign-born CEOs are likely to possess skills and knowledge related to foreign
institutional environments and have a mindset less focused on firms’ domestic
environments. Such skills and mindset may give foreign CEOs greater confidence and an
edge to engage in foreign expansions. Using a sample of 261 CEO successions taken
place in the largest companies around the world from 2005 to 2010, I find that foreignborn CEOs are likely to initiate more changes in firms’ international M&A strategy than
their national counterparts. Additionally, I show the moderating role of new CEOs’
insiderness; new CEOs with firm-specific skills are more likely to alter firms’
international M&A strategy than CEOs with a low level of firm-specific skills.

INTRODUCTION
What are the strategic implications of changing a company’s chief executive
officer (CEO)? Much of the popular press presumes that there is a link between CEO
origin and strategy and suggests that boards of directors change CEOs when radical
changes in firm strategy are needed (NYT, 2005; The Economist, 2012). This interest in
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CEO successions and their strategic and performance benefits has also been mirrored in
scholarly research. For example, management theorists have paid considerable attention
to examining successor origin – be it external or internal to the firm, or external or
internal to its industry – and its impact on firm outcomes (e.g., Chen & Hambrick, 2012;
Chung & Luo, 2013; Karaevli, 2007; Miller, 1993; Wiersema, 1992; Zhang &
Rajagopalan, 2010a).
Alongside the current successor types researched in the literature, I note in this
study that successors’ country of origin may also have a significant bearing on firm
strategy. Considering the growing number of foreign-born CEO appointments (Forbes,
2009; NYT, 2007; WSJ, 2004), it may be important to examine the strategic implications
of foreign-born CEO successions. By foreign-born and non-native CEOs, I mean
individuals who were born and spent their formative years4 in a country other than their
firm’s country of origin (Hambrick, Davidson, & Snell, 1998; Nielsen & Nielsen, 2013).
Based on prior research (e.g., Geletkanycz, 1997; Hambrick et al., 1998; Nielsen
& Nielsen, 2013), I argue that the institutional environment in which an executive is
reared may have an imprinting effect that may shape this person’s knowledge and skill
set and mindset (Geletkanycz, 1997). Chief executives’ abilities and mindsets, shaped in
part by their national origin (in addition to other factors) are likely to influence firm
strategy. Ultimately, foreign-born CEOs’ skills and mindsets could lead them to follow
different strategies from their native-born counterparts.
I focus more specifically on mergers and acquisitions (M&A), which have been
identified to serve as an important conduit for firms to change, reconfigure, and/or
4

Formative years refer to the experience of an individual from his/her birth to when he/she reaches 17.
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redeploy their capabilities (Barkema, Baum, & Mannix, 2002; Capron, Dussauge, &
Mitchell, 1998). I propose that foreign-born CEOs with their mindsets partly defined by
their national origin and by their experience living in their firm’s home country may be
more attuned to pursue international opportunities (Geletkanycz, 1997). Hence, foreignborn CEOs may instigate more changes in firms’ cross-border acquisition strategy than
their native counterparts. Following this same logic, native CEOs should be more
engaged in domestic mergers and acquisitions.
Second, I theorize on the moderating influence of CEOs’ company of origin by
exploring CEOs’ insiderness. I expect foreign CEOs who are internally appointed and
have significant firm-specific experience to be able to exert more changes in firms’ crossborder M&As. Indeed, like any externally appointed CEOs, outside foreign-born CEOs
(in contrast with insiders) lack firm-specific skills and support from key stakeholders
(Harris & Helfat, 1997; Karaevli, 2007; Shen & Canella, 2002; Zhang & Rajagopalan,
2004). This would in turn constrain their ability to take new strategic actions since they
may be disadvantaged by their limited knowledge of firms’ internal environment and by
their lack of ties with key organizational members. I argue that prior experience within
the firm could help mitigate some of these disadvantages. In addition, such prior
experience could help reduce additional obstacles that foreign CEOs may face. For
example, foreign CEO successions may be associated with some degree of cultural misfit
since foreign CEOs’ cultural heritage may differ significantly from that of key
organizational members (The Huffington Post, 2012).
In a similar vein, I propose that national CEOs could also be constrained by their
degree of insiderness. While externally-appointed national CEOs may not face the exact
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same challenges as the ones noted above (e.g., cultural misfit), they are likely to
experience similar obstacles. For example, their strategic actions could be considerably
impacted by their lack of firm-specific skills and knowledge of firms’ competitive
environments. I therefore expect new CEO insiderness to moderate the relationship
between national successions and changes in domestic M&As.
The hypotheses developed in this paper were tested using a dataset of new CEO
appointments made by public companies that were part of the Global 500 ranking
between the years 2005 and 2010. The ultimate sample consisted of 261 CEO
appointments, including 58 foreign successions in 234 unique firms originating from 27
countries. After controlling for firm, industry, and CEO factors, I find support for the
theoretical premise of this research that foreign successions do impact firms’ strategic
expansion as it relates to patterns of mergers and acquisitions.
Surveying foreign CEO successions and their strategic outcomes offers the
following contributions. First, it advances CEO succession research by elucidating the
importance of new CEOs’ national origin for firms’ strategic expansion. While a great
deal of research has focused on the industry and firm origins of new CEOs, the make-up
of the executive suite is changing. This paper shows that the internationalization of the
executive labor market has some important strategic implications.
Second, this study complements previous research on CEOs’ international
experience (e.g., Carpenter, Sanders, & Gregersen, 2001; Daily, Certo, & Dalton, 2000;
Sambharya, 1996; Takeuchi, Tesluk, Yun, & Lepak, 2005) by proposing another
dimension of executive profile that affects CEO strategies. Finally, by investigating the
impact of CEO profile on mergers and acquisitions, this study complements the vast
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literature on the consequences of CEO succession, which until now has mostly focused
on outcomes such as changes in firms’ product diversification strategy (e.g., Wiersema &
Bantel, 1992), corporate strategic refocusing (e.g., Bigley & Wiersema, 2002), or firm
performance (Karaevli, 2007; Shen & Canella, 2002).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. I first review CEO succession
research by taking stock of studies surveying the impact of different types of successions.
Second, I develop hypotheses surrounding the influence of non-national successions on
firms’ strategic expansion and the moderating role of successors’ company of origin.
Third, I elaborate on my research design and describe the sample and the key constructs
used in this research. Fourth, I describe my empirical results. Finally, I discuss my
findings and provide some concluding remarks.

TYPES OF SUCCESIONS AND THEIR STRATEGIC IMPACT
CEOs have been identified to be major architects of corporate strategy and
catalysts of change (Bigley & Wiersema, 2002; Child, 1972). Prior research has
discussed the strategic implications of various types of CEO successions and the benefits
associated with CEO successions. The general premise of this research is that when
successions occur, new CEOs with new skills, abilities, and perspectives take charge of
an organization (Boeker, 1997). These new CEOs will most likely draw on their existing
competencies and skills to make strategic decisions and initiate new strategic actions
(Finkelstein, Hambrick, & Cannela, 2009). The main types of successions studied in
prior literature, and reviewed briefly below, include intra-firm versus outside-firm
successions (or inside versus outside successions) and their extensions. Another strand of
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research has focused on intra-industry and outside-industry successions and their
implications.
Intra-firm versus outside-firm successions and extensions. Inspired by the work of
Grusky (1964) and Carlson (1961), an important volume of research has explored the
implications of opting for an inside versus an outside CEO succession (e.g., Canella &
Lubatkin, 1993; Chung & Luo, 2013; Giambatista, Rowe, & Riaz, 2005; Shen & Canella,
2002; Wiersema, 2002). It is often argued that inside successors bring firm-specific skills
to the forefront. Firm-specific skills could be defined as “tacit knowledge about unique
routines and procedures, corporate culture and informal norms, and experience with
specific management systems and processes” (Groysberg, McLean, & Norhia, 2006, p. 6).
These skills involve “an in-depth understanding of factors such as a company's history,
culture, and internal strengths and weaknesses” (Harris & Helfat, 1997, p. 896).
A general theme in this literature is that an outsider is more likely to implement
radical strategic change (Helfat & Baily, 2005). Extant CEO succession research often
equates outside successions to organizational change that further leads to better
performance (Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2010b). Outside successors are also more likely
after their appointment to bring in new executives, revamp firms’ top management teams,
and dismiss incumbent managers (Karaevli, 2007; Shen & Canella, 2002).
Some examples of research focusing on strategic change include the study by
Tushman, Virany, and Romanelli (1985), which showed that external successions were
positively associated with initiation of strategic reorientation. In a similar vein, Wiersema
(1992) proposed and demonstrated that outsiders were more likely to engage in postsuccession product diversification than insiders.
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Many scholars have also sought to extend the realm of this research to include
other salient dimensions of successor origin (Karaevli, 2007). For examples, going
beyond the strict internal vs. external differentiation, Wiersema (1995) explored nonroutine and routine successions5 and their influence on organizational restructuring.
Bigley and Wiersema (2002) discussed the importance of considering heir apparent
experience when theorizing about the impact of insiders on strategic change. Their
argument lies in the idea that not all inside appointments are created equal. Heir apparent
experience could provide a significant edge to insiders since heir apparent executives
derive significant benefits from on-the-job training and their firm-specific skills, referred
to in this literature as their familiarity with firms’ internal context (Ocasio, 1999; Zhang
& Rajagopalan, 2004).
Another study highlighting firm-specific skills was conducted by Zhang and
Rajagopalan (2004); the authors made a distinction between relay successions, non-relay
successions, and outside successions and theorized about the impact of each type of
successions. They showed that relay successions were associated with a lower risk of
mismatch between new CEOs and their new firms which in turn positively affects firm
performance. Similarly, Shen and Canella (2002) examined the performance implications
of hiring different types of CEO successors: contenders, followers, and outsiders. These
authors found that the senior executive turnover following a contender succession had a
positive effect on firm performance. They argue that contenders given their familiarity
with the existing cadre of executives and their firm-specific skills might be in a favorable

5

A routine succession occurs when an executive departs due to retirement.

90

position to replace executives and identify executives that could help them accomplish
the needed strategic change.
Outside-industry versus intra-industry successions. Others studies have brought to
the forefront the salience of CEO’s industry of origin distinguishing between intra and
outside industry successors (Harris & Helfat, 1997; Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2003). Intraindustry successors are likely to possess industry-specific skills or the “technical,
regulatory, customer, or supplier knowledge unique to an industry” (Groysberg et al.,
2006, p. 3). “Intra-industry successors have industry-specific knowledge that may be
readily transferable to firms in the same industry” (Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2003, p. 327).
For example, a CEO leading a firm operating under the rules of the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration may develop different industry-specific skills vis-à-vis a CEO managing a
firm that has to comply with the rules of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(Groysberg et al., 2006).
Consequently, opting for an outside or an intra-industry succession may have
important organizational implications. Zhang and Rajagopalan (2003) assert that hiring
external CEOs from the same industry is likely to increase the chance of learning from
the strategies and practices of competitors in the same industry. On the other hand, hiring
an outside industry successor may be favored if the firm seeks a change from “industry
recipes” (Spender, 1989). For example, Marvin Miller, who came from the steel industry,
with its heavily militant union, transformed the strategies and practices of the baseball
players’ association by transplanting some of the same techniques he had learned from
managing a steel company (Chacar & Hesterly, 2008). In a related study, Chen and
Hambrick (2012) showed that troubled firms operating in a struggling industry will
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benefit from having a new CEO who is an industry outsider. According to the authors,
“such an executive provides fresh perspective, new knowledge, and new perspective to
facilitate the requisite departure from industry recipes” (Chen & Hambrick, 2012, p. 229).
More recently, the interest in the firm and industry of origin of the CEO in
succession research seems to be waning; interest has shifted more generally on examining
the relationship between CEO profiles in general and strategic actions and firm
performance (Lewis, Walls, & Dowell, 2013; Luo, Kanuri, & Andrews, 2013) and on
exploring other factors influencing CEOs’ actions (Quigley & Hambrick, 2012; Westphal
& Deephouse, 2011). However, as I stated earlier, an important aspect of new CEO
origin, his/her nationality, has never been examined before despite its importance as
argued below.

HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
While CEO succession research has shown that CEOs’ origin and experiences
confer them skills and abilities that have important strategic ramifications, we do not
know much about the implications of foreign successions. In the subsequent sections, I
discuss an additional facet of CEO origin, namely country of origin, and its importance
for firms’ strategic expansion. I also theorize on its interplay with CEOs’ company of
origin or degree of insiderness arguing that a match between a firm’s nationality and its
CEO’s origin, or the lack thereof, will drive its mergers and acquisitions strategy.
More specifically, I hypothesize that given that their skills and mindsets are likely
to be less related to firms’ domestic environment, foreign-born CEOs are likely to initiate
more changes in firms’ cross-border M&A strategy than their national counterparts.
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Alternatively, I expect national CEOs to engage in more changes related domestic M&As.
Finally, I consider the moderating influence of CEOs’ company of origin contending that
foreign insiders may be better positioned to initiate changes in firms’ international
expansion. Figure 2 provides a summary of the hypotheses on which I elaborate below.

Figure 2: Conceptual Model

CEO Insiderness

+
Foreign Succession

National Succession

+

Changes in Cross-Border M&As

+

Changes in Domestic M&As

Foreign successions and changes in M&As
As noted above, current research has explored successors’ industry and company
origins and the skills that they may embody, namely firm-specific skills when
considering intra-firm versus outside-firm successions, and industry-specific skills
surveying intra-industry and outside-industry successions. A third type of skills that may
be important to consider is country-specific skills. Country-specific skills (CSS) to
managers’ knowledge and abilities that are applicable and specific to a particular national
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institutional context. CSS could also include language (Duvander, 2001) and expertise in
dealing and building relationships with suppliers, customers, regulators, and other key
stakeholders in a particular country.
Not only country-specific skills may influence the preference of firms for national
CEOs versus foreign-born CEOs, but also they are likely to impact the strategic path that
a CEO takes. I argue here that CSS could play a significant role in shaping firms’
expansion choices. First, foreign CEOs may have CSS that relate to another country
environment from firms’ home country. Having CSS related to other institutional
environments could help foreign-borns develop a mindset or frame of reference that is
less centered on firms’ domestic environment. We know that managers’ individual
experiences shape their mental representations of the world and their cognitive schema
(Fiske & Taylor, 1984; Wiersema, 1992), which in turn influence their strategic-decision
making process.
In addition to these CSS, being born and raised in another country is susceptible
to affect people’s mental representation of the world. Research in psychology has shown
that people significantly exposed to at least two cultural systems such as non-nationals
are prone to be influenced by dual cultural identities leading them to engage in active
cultural frame switching” (Benet-Martinez, Leu, Lee, & Morris, 2002, p. 493). Cultural
frame switching characterizes situations in which people “move between different
cultural meaning systems in response to situational cues” (Benet-Martinez et al., 2002, p.
493). It also implies that foreigners may have a strong cultural imprint of a country other
than firms’ country of origin; they are therefore likely have a mindset or world view less
focused on firms’ domestic setting than that of their national counterparts.
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I suggest that such mindset would help foreign CEOs to be more attuned to global
opportunities than their national counterparts. As argued by Nadkarni and Perez (2007),
executives’ mindsets influence the alternatives that they consider when making strategic
decisions. Since international expansion requires that managers overcome their domestic
mindset and domestic myopia (Barkema & Vermeulen, 1998; Carpenter & Fredrickson,
2001) and foreign CEOs are likely to have a mindset less entrenched in firms’ domestic
environment, I expect them to be more predisposed to consider international expansion
options as opposed to domestic ones.
In addition to such mindset, new CEOs tend to act according to their going-in
mandate or the expectations of board members at the time of their appointment
(Finkelstein et al., 2009; Vancil, 1987). Their initial actions tend to reflect this mandate.
In the case of a foreign succession, board members are likely to expect the new CEO to
make important changes related to companies’ international activities. For example, a
UK-based executive recruiter recounted that there is a growing demand in the executive
labor market for non-national top executives to globalize companies (FT, 2012). Hence,
one could expect foreign CEOs to have a significant penchant toward international
expansions to fulfill such expectations (FT, 2012). In order to sustain such
internationalization efforts, they are likely to hire other foreigners in the corporate suite.
Conversely, since national CEOs are more likely to hold skills and institutional
knowledge that for the most relate to firms’ home country, they may possess an
advantage related to their perception of firms’ domestic opportunities. They may
therefore be more inclined to grow firms domestically since they might perceive foreign
risks as greater.
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The above arguments led me to propose the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1. A foreign CEO is likely to initiate more changes in cross-border
M&As than a national CEO.
Hypothesis 2. A national CEO is likely to initiate more changes in domestic
M&As than a foreign CEO.

The moderating influence of CEO’s insiderness
Earlier, I proposed that foreign-born CEOs are likely to engage in more changes
related to firms’ international M&As than their national counterparts. In the following
section, I discuss the extent to which such relationship may be contingent upon new
CEOs’ insiderness. While most research has dichotomized CEOs’ company of origin,
recent research has discussed the need to consider different degrees of insiderness
(Finkelstein et al., 2009; Karaevli, 2007). The idea is that a new CEO who has been
working for a firm two years at the time of his/her appointment is a different type of
insider vis-à-vis an individual who has spent twenty-five years within a firm (Finkelstein
et al., 2009). Finkelstein and colleagues (2009) observe that the former individual could
be considered an outsider compared to the CEO with twenty-five years of tenure.
As highlighted above, insiderness and outsiderness are thought to confer CEOs
different skills and abilities and are likely to shape their strategic actions. While outsiders
are considered more equipped to bring a new and fresh perspective to the organization
and initiative important strategic changes (Finkelstein et al., 2009; Kesner & Sebora,
1994), extant research has emphasized significant disadvantages to new CEOs’
outsiderness, which could significantly reduce its benefits (e.g., Karaevli, 2007). First, as
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Karaevli (2007) observed, “as a new CEO’s outsiderness increases, it is more likely that
he or she will lack critical firm- and industry-specific skills” to make important strategic
decisions (688). Second, there is an important risk that a new outsider does not fit well
with the culture and the strategic demands of the organization (Karaevli, 2007). Third,
there is a strong likelihood that current TMT members will leave the firm; the members
who stay are likely to have a negative attitude toward the new appointee (Shen &
Cannella, 2002).
In the case of foreign successions, it may be expected that the appointment of a
foreign-born individual could engender some additional challenges or even some frictions
in some cases (FT, 2012). First, there might be some uncertainty regarding the ability of a
foreigner to fit the national culture of firms’ home country (NYT, 2007). A foreign CEO
succession could be associated with cultural problems since foreign CEOs’ culture may
be different from that of other key organizational members (i.e., board members and
TMT members), which might lead to cultural clashes. Second, while in any succession
event there is always a possibility of a misfit between the CEO and the organization
(Karaevli, 2007; Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2003), such potential misfit might be exacerbated
in the case of a foreign CEO succession given the additional complexity inherent in the
diversity that a non-national brings to the corporate suite. Also, there might be some
language problems since foreign CEOs may not have the same native language as the
language spoken in the country in which they lead.
To illustrate the idea of misfit, one could point out several examples. Recently,
the CEO of the Japanese company Olympus, Michael Woodford (a British national), was
dismissed because of his lack of understanding of the company’s management and the
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Japanese culture (The Huffington Post, 2012). Another example relates to Sol Trujillo,
the ex American-born CEO of the Australian firm Telstra. Sol Trujillo claimed to have
experienced a great deal of racism during his tenure at Testra and have suffered from the
lack of diversity that exists within the company (ABC News, 2009).
I argue that such factors could be less pronounced in the case of an inside foreign
succession. Tenure within the organization may have granted foreign CEOs the
opportunity to build firm-specific skills and knowledge that could facilitate the initiation
of new strategies. Also, he/she may have had the chance to acquire significant knowledge
about a firm’s organizational culture and its national heritage (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989);
such knowledge could be instrumental to interact with important internal and external
stakeholders and obtain their support. Second, their potential social ties to organizational
members and stakeholders could help them mitigate some of the important challenges
that new CEOs face when joining the executive suite (Finkelstein et al., 2009). Finally,
the potential misfit and cultural frictions noted earlier could be reduced since the board in
the case of an inside succession could better assess the suitability of an internal candidate
for the post. We know that the risk of adverse selection is lower in the case of inside
successions.
Hence, I propose the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3. The effect a foreign-born CEO on changes in cross-border M&As
is greater when he or she has a higher level of insiderness.
In addition to exerting an influence on foreign CEOs’ ability to initiate changes,
insiderness may also impact national CEOs’ capacity to alter firms’ domestic M&As
strategy. While national CEOs that are externally appointed may not be subject to the
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cultural frictions described above, their capacity to initiate strategic actions could
nevertheless be influenced by their lack of firm-specific skills and social ties with key
firms’ constituents. I therefore expect insiderness to be positively related to national
CEOs’ ability to institute changes in firms’ domestic M&A strategy. Hence, I propose:
Hypothesis 4. The effect a national CEO on changes in domestic M&As is greater
when he or she has a higher level of insiderness.

METHODS
The population for this study is all firms listed on the Global 500 ranking from
2005 to 2010 resulting in a total of 689 unique firms from 36 countries. After deleting
privately held firms, state-owned companies, and subsidiaries of other firms, a total of
533 firms remained. I identified 376 CEO successions occurring within these firms. CEO
names were primarily obtained using the Global 500 database. Missing names were
collected using various sources such as the Directory of Corporate Affiliations,
Corporate Library (for US firms), Hoovers, companies’ annual reports, and 20F.
Data on CEOs’ profiles and appointment dates were collected primarily via
content-analyzing biographies derived from a variety of sources such as the Directory of
Corporate Affiliations, company’s annual reports and 20F, companies’ website, Lexis
Nexis, Business Week Executive Profile, Hoovers, Who’s Who in Business and Finance,
and Bloomberg. Using such data sources, I could find complete information on the
characteristics of 293 CEOs.

99

Following prior succession research, I eliminated all CEO successions in which
the CEO’s tenure was two years or less. I then obtained a sample of 285 successions.
Firm and industry level variables were collected via SDC Platinum (a Thomson Reuters
database), Bloomberg, Capital IQ (a Standard and Poor’s database), company’s annual
reports and 20F. After combining firm-level and industry-level variables, the final
sample is composed of 261 CEO successions occurring in 234 companies (implanted in
27 countries). 208 firms had one succession and 26 companies experienced two
successions.
Measures
Criterion Variables
Change in Cross-Border M&As. This variable is measured as follows. I first calculated
the change between the number of cross-border M&As pre-succession and post
succession. The measure could depicted by the following equation:
[(cross-border M&As t+1 + cross-border M&As t+2 )/2] - cross-border M&As t-1
Second, I took the absolute value of this change and standardized the absolute
value (mean=0, standard deviation=1) (Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2010a). The selection of a
two-year post-succession period was chosen since previous succession research indicates
that most strategic actions taken by CEOs occur in the first two years in office (Gabarro,
1987; Shen & Canella, 2002; Vancil, 1987). This variable was obtained using Thomson
Financial Securities Data Worldwide M&A database (also called SDC platinum). This
database includes a comprehensive record of all M&As that were completed on a
worldwide basis (Dikova, Sahib, & van Witteloostuijn, 2009). SDC platinum data were
compiled using a number of different sources including foreign and US newspapers, SEC
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statements and records, records obtained from comparable institutions in foreign
countries, and various other outlets (Dikova et al., 2009). SDC provides data on the
geographical location of the target and acquiring firms that helped identify cross-border
deals.
Changes in Domestic M&As. This variable is measured in the same way as the previous
construct, change in cross-border M&As. Instead of considering cross-border deals
however, I used mergers and acquisitions completed in firms’ home country.
Explanatory Variable and Moderator
Foreign/National Succession. This is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the CEO
was born and raised in a country other than his/her firm’s country of origin and 0
otherwise (Hambrick et al., 1998). A value of 1 indicates a foreign succession and a value
of 0 refers to a national succession. Information on CEO nationality and formative years
was collected via several sources including Hoovers, company’s annual reports and 20F,
Bloomberg, Lexis Nexis, and Who is Who in Business and Finance, and a 1000 CEOs.
The geographical implantation of firms’ headquarter was found in Compustat North
America, Compustat Global, Bloomberg, and Capital IQ. Three firms (Unilever, Royal
Dutch Shell, and Rio Tinto) had dual headquarters and were assigned to the oldest
headquarter’ country for convenience. Out of the 261 CEO successions observed, there
were 58 foreign-born CEO successions.
New CEOs’ Insiderness. This is a continuous variable measured by the number of years
that a new CEO worked at a firm at the time of his or her appointment. This measure
ranges from 0 (outside CEOs with no experience with the firm) to 47. To create the
interaction term between foreign-born successions and new CEOs’ insiderness, I mean-

101

centered the moderating variable to address potential multicollinearity issues (Aiken &
West, 1993). Information on CEOs’ professional experience was gathered through a
number of outlets including Lexis Nexis, Business Week Executive Profile, Hoovers,
Who’s Who in Business and Finance, Bloomberg, company’s annual reports and 20F,
and companies’ website.
Control Variables
I introduced in the models a number of control variables to account for the effect
of other possible explanatory variables.
In addition to the modeling technique used to control for fixed firm effects, I used
the following controls at the firm level. Following prior CEO succession research, I
controlled for pre-succession firm size (t-1) as measured by the log of assets since firm
size could affect firms’ strategic direction (Miller, 1991). Second, I controlled for presuccession firm performance (t-1) as measured by adjusted return on assets (ROA)
defined as a focal firm’s ROA adjusted by its industry ROA. The third firm level control
was free cash flow (t-1) since, in addition to ROA, it could impact firms’ financial health
and the availability of internal funds that could use to finance their acquisitions (Harford,
1999). This variable is measured by the difference between cash flow from operations
and capital expenditures. Data for firm size, adjusted ROA, and free cash flow were
collected through Bloomberg. Fourth, since multinationals firms are likely to engage in
more cross-border M&As as opposed to domestic firms, I added a dummy variable to the
models taking a value of 1 if a firm derives more than 10% of its sales abroad and 0
otherwise. Data for firms’ foreign sales ratio were obtained through several sources
including firms’ annual reports and 20F, Capital IQ, and Bloomberg. Fifth, I controlled
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for firm age, as the stage of a firm’s life cycle could affect M&As. Data on firm age were
obtained through Bloomberg. Finally, prior number of M&As (t-1) was used as a control
since the present study’s dependent variable is measuring change in M&A strategy;
change scores are likely to correlated with their initial measurement point (Bergh &
Fairbank, 2002); this control also accounts for a firm’s proclivity to rely on mergers and
acquisitions in the domestic arena and outside of its country of origin. Prior number of
M&As was found in SDC Platinum.
To account for industry variations, I added two industry controls. The first one
relates to firms’ level of industry globalization captured by the average foreign sales ratio
of each firm’s primary industry (measured at the 2-digit SIC level) (Carpenter et al.,
2001). Another control is made for industry concentration measured by the four-firm
concentration ratio for a company’s main Global Industry Classification Standard
(GICS6) (Chacar, Newburry, Vissa, &, 2010). Data to calculate this ratio were collected
using Bloomberg.
At the CEO level, I controlled for international experience captured by a factor
composed of CEOs’ educational and professional experience outside their home country
and their firm’s country of origin. The factor is comprised of the following three
indicators: 1) educational experience 2) number of years spent abroad 3) number of
countries in which an individual worked. These indicators were collected through various
sources including Lexis Nexis, Business Week Executive Profile, Hoovers, Who’s Who in
Business and Finance, the International Directory of Business Biographies, Bloomberg,
company’s annual reports and 20F, and companies’ website.
6

GISC distinguishes 24 industry groups.
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Finally, two additional controls were entered in the models. I introduced a year of
hire control measured by the year in which a CEO was appointed to account for the
potential impact of time variations within the period of study (Zhang & Rajagopalan,
2003). I also controlled for companies’s region of origin using dummy variables. In order
to classify companies into regions, I divided the world into three regions: Europe, the
Americas, and Asia (Hitt, Hoskisson, & Kim, 1997). There were no firms from Africa,
the fourth region in this typology.

Analysis technique and procedure
Considering the nested nature of my dataset (firms could experience a maximum
of two successions during the period of time under study) and the continuous nature of
the dependent variables, I estimated a multilevel regression model correcting for the lack
of independence of the observations. This model allows me to take into account withinfirm correlations. Furthermore, the database is an unbalanced panel as the number of
succession varies by firms (as noted earlier).

RESULTS
Table 5 below presents the correlation matrix and descriptive statistics. Analyzing
the correlation between the predictors, I note that two correlation coefficients are greater
than 0.30 (in absolute value); namely, the correlation between the multinational dummy
and industry globalization and the association between previous number of cross-border
M&As and log of assets. Hence, I examined potential threat of multicollinearity using
variance inflation factors (VIFs). The mean VIF is 1.44 and no individual VIF is higher
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than 2.13 (Kleinbaum, Kupper, & Muller, 1988). These results indicate that there are no
collinearity issues in the model.
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Table 5: Summary Statistics and Zero-Order Correlation Coefficients
Variables
1. Change in
cross-border
M&As
2. Change in
domestic
M&As
3. Foreign
succession
4. New CEO
insiderness
5. Industry
concentration
6. Industry
globalization
7. Firm age
8. Adjusted
ROA
9. Log of assets
10. Free cash
flow
11.
Multinational
dummy
12. CEO’s Intl.
Experience
13. Number of
cross-border
M&As (presuccession)
14. Number of
domestic
M&As (presuccession)

Mean
1.97

SD
2.87

1
1

2

3

4

5

7

8

9

10

1.66

2.66

0.12

1

0.23

0.42

0.13

-0.10

1

-0.02

13.14

-0.02

0.03

-0.26

1

0.24

0.09

0.24

0.06

0.04

-0.12

1

0.42

0.18

0.11

-0.08

0.17

-0.01

-0.03

1

97.31
-0.74

77
6.26

0.04
-0.04

-0.11
0.05

0.08
0.06

-0.07
-0.01

-0.12
-0.02

0.16
0.01

1
0.01

1

10.82
2247.
59
0.83

1.53
12848.
79
0.37

0.31
0.02

0.14
-0.01

-0.02
0.09

-0.06
-0.03

0.04
0.08

0.10
0.00

0.19
-0.01

0.01
0.00

1
0.08

1

0.19

0.00

0.16

-0.18

-0.01

0.40

0.07

-0.03

0.20

0.01

1

4.33

6.91

0.04

-0.09

0.26

-0.31

0.08

0.18

0.10

0.00

0.03

0.04

0.14

1

3.56

6.04

0.58

0.13

0.08

-0.13

0.08

0.09

0.16

-0.00

0.42

-0.24

0.22

0.13

1

2.26

3.33

0.17

0.56

-0.09

0.15

0.10

-0.03

-0.06

0.11

0.25

-0.10

0.02

-0.09

0.32
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6

11

12

13

14

1

The results for testing the effect of foreign-born CEOs on change in cross-border
M&As are presented in Table 6 (H1 and H3). Table 7 provides the results to assess the
influence of national CEOs on change in domestic M&As (H2 and H4). In each model,
Model 1 represents the base model introducing only the control variables.

Table 6: Drivers of Changes in Cross-Border M&As
Variables
Control variables
Firms’ region of origin
Year of hire
Industry concentration
Industry globalization
Firm age
Adjusted ROA
Log of assets
Free cash flow
Multinational dummy
CEO’s intl. experience
Previous number of cross-border
M&As (pre-succession)
Predictor variables
Foreign succession (H1)
New CEO insiderness
Foreign succession X New CEO
insiderness (H2)
N
Wald chi-square
Log restricted-likelihood

Model 1
n.s.
-0.06†
-0.91†
0.27
-0.00†
-0.00
0.04
0.00***
0.05
0.00
0.10***

Model 2
n.s.
-0.07*
-0.88†
0.26
-0.00†
-0.00
0.04
0.00***
0.04
-0.00
0.10***
0.31*

261
261
169.46*** 175.92***
-344.77
-345.99

Note: (†)p<0.1; (*)p<0.05; (**)p<0.01; (***)p<0.001.
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Model 3
n.s.
-0.03
-0.43
0.16
-0.00†
-0.00
0.02
0.00***
0.04
-0.00
0.10***
1.08***
.002
0.126***
261

251.95***
-331.36

Table 7: Drivers of Changes in Domestic M&As
Variables
Control variables
Firms’ region of origin
Year of hire
Industry concentration
Industry globalization
Firm age
Adjusted ROA
Log of assets
Free cash flow
Multinational dummy
CEO’s intl. experience
Previous number of domestic M&As
(pre-succession)
Predictor variables
National succession (H2)
New CEO insiderness
National succession * New CEO
insiderness (H4)
N
Wald chi-square
Log restricted-likelihood

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

n.s.
-0.00
-0.03
-0.20
-0.00
-0.00
0.00
3.44
0.01
-0.00
0.17***

n.s.
-0.00
-0.04
-0.20
-0.00
-0.00
0.00
3.66
0.01
0.00
0.17**

n.s
-0.04
0.34
-0.33
-0.00*
0.01
0.09*
8.82
0.05
-0.00
0.01

-0.11

261
122.83***
-361.53

261
123.00***
-362.13

Notes: (†)p<0.1; (*)p<0.05; (**)p<0.01; (***)p<0.00

-0.12
-6.06
-0.00
261
19.69
-409.85

Starting with the analysis of table 2 (testing H1 and H3), in model 1 the
coefficients for firm age, industry concentration, free cash flow, and previous number of
cross-border M&As are statistically significant.
Model 2 tests the results for H1 in which the link between foreign-born CEOs and
changes in international M&As is hypothesized. As shown in model 2, foreign-born
succession is statistically significant (p<0.05) and the sign of the coefficient is positive.
These results provide support for H1. Model 3 tests the interaction of foreign-born
successions and new CEOs’ insiderness (H3). The coefficient for the interaction term is
positive and statistically significant (p<0.001) lending support for H3. This result
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indicates that the positive effect of foreign succession on changes in cross-border M&As
is stronger at higher levels of insiderness.
Table 3 examines the impact of national CEOs on changes in domestic M&As
(H2). Model 1 suggests that there is positive relationship between changes in domestic
M&As and previous number of domestic M&As (p<0.001). This result remains stable in
model 2.
As shown in model 2, the relationship between national successions and changes
in domestic M&As (H2) is not supported (always the sign of the coefficient is negative as
predicted). Model 3 tests the interaction of national successions and new CEOs’
insiderness (H4). The coefficient for the interaction term is not statistically significant.
Hence, H4 is not supported.

Post hoc analysis and robustness checks
I conducted an additional series of test to check the robustness and stability of the
findings. First, I used alternative operationalizations of some covariates. I reran the
models using two alternative measures of performance: adjusted return on equity and
sales growth. The results remain almost unchanged except that the significance level for
the foreign succession coefficient (testing H1) became marginal when using sales growth
(p=0.07). Likewise, I obtained identical results when employing different measures of
firm size including log of sales and log of employees. In addition, I retested the
hypotheses using firms’ degree of internationalization as opposed to the Multinational
dummy used in the models reported in table 2. The findings were consistent with the ones
reported in the results section.
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Second, I introduced other controls. Succession research has highlighted the
influence of the similarity between a new CEO and his/her predecessor on strategic
change (Finkelstein et al., 2009). I therefore added to the statistical analysis a dummy
variable controlling for the previous CEO’s national origin. Previous CEO’s national
origin is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the previous CEO was born and raised
in a country other than his/her firm’s headquarter country and 0 otherwise. I identified
previous CEOs’ name using Bloomberg, directory of corporate affiliations, and
company’s annual reports and 20F. To identify their national origin, I used the same
sources as the ones employed to find the national origin of newly appointed CEOs. The
results were consistent with the ones described above. I also controlled for CEO age
since previous research has shown that younger CEOs might have a tendency to engage
in more risky types of strategic initiatives vis-à-vis their older counterparts (Hambrick &
Mason, 1984). The results were also in line with my earlier findings.
Finally, I retested the hypotheses using OLS and applying a correction for
intragroup correlation (given that one company could experience two successions during
the time period under study). The results were consistent with the ones reported above. I
would like to nevertheless note the significance level for the foreign succession
coefficient (testing H1) improved slightly (p= 0.016) compared to the p-value obtained
when testing the model reported in table 2 (p=0.039).

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
CEO succession is a unique and visible event, with a likely critical impact on
firms’ external and internal stakeholders (e.g., Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2004). During the
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past decades, researchers have paid considerable attention to CEO origin and its link to
firm strategy, ignoring CEOs’ country of origin (see Kesner & Sebora, 1994 and
Giambatista et al., 2005 for a review). In this research, I extend this body of work by
demonstrating the salience of CEOs’ country of origin, a type of successor origin that has
not been examined in the current CEO succession literature.
More specifically, examining firms’ expansion via mergers and acquisitions, I
demonstrate that foreign successions significantly differ from national successions. I find
that foreign successors are likely to engage in more changes related to cross-border
mergers and acquisitions than their national counterparts. This link could be explained by
the fact that foreign CEOs are likely to have an imprinting and mindset that may be less
embedded in firms’ home country vis-à-vis their national counterparts. Also, boards of
directors may expect foreign CEOs to extend the realm of companies to the global arena
prompting them to consider international expansion in a more salient way than domestic
expansions (FT, 2012). This result complements the findings of prior studies exploring
the link between CEO origin and different outcomes such as strategic resource allocations
(e.g., Wiersema, 1992), corporate strategic refocusing (e.g., Bigley & Wiersema, 2002),
or firm performance (e.g., Karaevli, 2007; Shen & Canella, 2002).
Focusing on chief executives, this study also contributes to the burgeoning
literature on executives’ national origin. In a conceptual paper published in 1998,
Hambrick and colleagues highlighted that there are considerable traces of nationality in
people’s behaviors. Using a sample of global 500 companies, the present study indicates
that such traces of nationality could be manifested in the context of M&A strategy. In
addition, most of the research addressing the impact of nationality has been confined to
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the group setting. For example, Ahmadjian and Robins (2005) studied the influence of
foreign investors on Japanese companies and showed that the presence of foreign
investors fostered the adoption of shareholder-based governance. Ramaswamy and Li
(2001) surveyed the influence of foreign board members on the corporate diversification
of Indian firms. Nielsen and Nielsen (2013) demonstrated the positive influence of TMT
national diversity on firm performance in the context of Swiss companies. We may also
note that these studies are conducted within the realm of one national setting or country.
This study broadens this endeavor by looking at a global sample of firms, the Global 500.
Finally, addressing the interplay between CEOs’ country of origin and their
degree of insiderness offers important implications for CEO succession research. As
noted earlier, recent research has brought to the fore the need to consider multiple facets
of successor origin (Karaevli, 2007; Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2003; 2004). While previous
research has largely theorized on the drawbacks of outsiderness and insiderness, this
study explores some of the obstacles associated with “foreignness” which could be
mitigated by CEOs’ prior experience with the organization.
As a first attempt to study the strategic consequences of foreign-born successions,
this study has some limitations offering some promising avenues for future research. First,
this study’s scope is confined to changes in mergers and acquisitions without taking into
account organic growth or other entry modes (Barkema & Vermeulen, 1998). Future
research could consider strategic expansion via different entry modes. Second, the data
used in this research contain only mergers and acquisitions that have reached the stage of
public announcements. While SDC Platinum uses data collected from SEC filings and
filings made to similar regulatory bodies in foreign countries and from a number of other
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outlets (e.g., news, trade publications) and offers a very comprehensive database, there
may be some transactions that may not be captured by the data (Dikova et al., 2009).
Third, the use of large global 500 firms could limit the generalizability of the findings.
Future research could focus on other related questions related to foreign-born
CEO successions. An extension of this study could be the examination of patterns of
geographical expansions. For example, do foreign-born CEOs initiate more expansions in
their region of origin vis-à-vis other regions? One could argue that country (region)specific skills could help them pursue expansion opportunities in their region of origin.
Second, while we know that CEOs are likely to influence firm strategy, extant research
has also identified the implications of successions for firm success. Future research could
investigate the performance implications of foreign-born successions and the strategic
changes which they may impart.
In summary, this study is the first according to my knowledge to survey the
strategic implications of hiring a foreign-born individual to head the corporate suite. I
hope it prompts management theorists to delve further into the strategic implications of
foreign-born CEO successions.
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